CVE-2026-63499 (GHSA-v2g6-7r9j-v6px) is a relative-path-traversal / improper-permission-assignment flaw in zt-zip (org.zeroturnaround:zt-zip <= 1.18.0, fixed in 1.18.1). When ZipUtil.unpack(File, File) is used to extract an untrusted archive, a ZIP entry whose name resolves to the output directory itself (for example an entry named /, ./, . or a/..) is accepted by the path-traversal guard because it does not escape the target directory. The extraction callback then takes the entry's stored Unix file mode (read from the entry's Unix mode / ASi extra field) and applies it to the resolved destination — which, for these self-referencing names, is the output directory itself. This lets an attacker widen the permissions of the output directory (e.g. turn an owner-only directory into a world-accessible one).\n\nRoot cause: the permission-application step in the per-entry callback (ZipUtil$Unpacker.process) did not distinguish a destination that is the output directory from a genuine descendant, and the traversal guard (ZipUtil.checkDestinationFileForTraversal) intentionally allowed such self-referencing entries. The fix (commit 1b625467 / 9413ea96, PR #191, release v1.18.1) adds the destinationIsOutputDir guard in the Unpacker.process method so permissions are skipped when the destination resolves to the output directory, and refactors checkDestinationFileForTraversal to a segment scan while documenting that self-referencing entries remain permitted.\n\nAt runtime, exploiting this CVE drives the call chain ZipUtil.unpack -> ZipUtil.iterate -> ZipUtil$Unpacker.process (which calls ZipUtil.checkDestinationFileForTraversal and then ZTFilePermissionsUtil.getDefaultStategy().setPermissions). The functions to watch in a Java profiler are the per-entry callback ZipUtil$Unpacker.process (where the vulnerable permission application occurs) and the traversal guard ZipUtil.checkDestinationFileForTraversal. Note that the helper methods destinationIsOutputDir and isSafeDescendantEntryName were ADDED by the patch as the mitigation and therefore are not vulnerable functions; the permission-application utility ZTFilePermissionsUtil.getDefaultStategy().setPermissions is unmodified library code and merely the sink that is (incorrectly) invoked on the output directory.