8.5

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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CVE-2026-59185

CVE-2026-59185: Identrail Cross-tenant IDOR: Client-supplied GitHub App installation_id is bound to the caller's workspace without ownership verification

Summary

identrail's GitHub App connection-completion endpoint binds a fully client-supplied installation_id to the caller's workspace without verifying that the installation belongs to, or was installed by, the workspace that initiated the connect flow. identrail then mints a GitHub App installation access token for the supplied installation_id using the app's own JWT, so an authenticated tenant can link any other identrail customer's GitHub App installation into their own workspace and read that victim organization's private repositories.

Affected code (default-on path, no feature flag)

Route: internal/api/router.go:3590 — POST /v1/workspaces/:workspace_id/projects/:project_id/github/connect/complete. installation_id is read from the JSON body or the attacker-controlled X-GitHub-Installation-ID header (router.go:3582-3588).
Service: internal/api/github_connect.go:781 CompleteGitHubConnection. The state token IS rigorously bound to the caller's scope (github_connect.go:818: if stateRecord.TenantID != scope.TenantID || stateRecord.WorkspaceID != project.WorkspaceID || stateRecord.ProjectID != project.ProjectID { ... }), but the only check on installation_id is request.InstallationID <= 0 (:794). The raw client value is persisted as the workspace's connection (:840).
Cross-tenant read primitive: internal/connectors/github/repositories.go:39 ListInstallationRepositories → internal/connectors/github/app.go:170 mints a token via POST /app/installations/{installationId}/access_tokens signed with the App JWT, succeeding for any installation where identrail's app is installed.

The feature-flagged V2 path CompleteGitHubConnector (github_connect.go:447, default off) shares the gap and is additionally weaker (matches pending connector by state value alone with no caller-scope re-check); a single fix should cover both.

Intent proof

The code binds state to {TenantID, WorkspaceID, ProjectID} and re-verifies it at completion (:818), demonstrating it understands binding is required. The asymmetry — state bound, installation_id unbound — is the missed check.

Exploitation

Attacker is any authenticated identrail tenant; they call StartGitHubConnection for their own workspace and receive a state.
Attacker calls the completion route with {state: <their state>, installation_id: V} where V is a victim org's identrail GitHub App installation id (installation ids are not secret — they appear in post-install redirect URLs, webhook payloads, the org's GitHub App settings, and are enumerable integers).
CompleteGitHubConnection accepts (state matches attacker scope), ListInstallationRepositories(V) mints a token for V and lists the victim org's private repos, and the connection is persisted under the attacker's workspace.
Attacker now reads the victim org's private repository inventory and can drive posture scans/repo reads via their own workspace.

Impact: cross-tenant disclosure of another customer organization's private GitHub repositories and metadata.

Remediation

Bind installation_id with the same rigor as state: capture it from GitHub's signed post-install redirect (setup_url/callback_url) and pin it to the pending state at start time, and/or after minting verify the installation's account matches the org the initiating workspace is authorized for.

(GitHub Advisory)

Miggo Vulnerability Database

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CVE-2026-59185

CVE-2026-59185:

8.5

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
github.com/identrail/identrail	go	< 1.0.2	1.0.2

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability is a cross-tenant Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in the GitHub App connection flow. The root cause is the system's failure to verify ownership of the installation_id provided by the client during the connection completion step. An authenticated attacker could provide the installation_id of another tenant's GitHub App installation. The system would then incorrectly bind this installation to the attacker's workspace, granting them access to the victim's private repositories and metadata.

The analysis of the patch commit 835e40517509d6ef5405c27fbf14f579bedff0e7 confirms this. The core of the vulnerability lies in the CompleteGitHubConnection and CompleteGitHubConnector functions in internal/api/github_connect.go. These functions accepted the installation_id without validation. The patch introduces a verification step by using an OAuth code (obtained during the GitHub App installation flow) to confirm that the user initiating the connection has access to the specified installation_id.

Additionally, the route handlers in internal/api/router.go were vulnerable because they provided a fallback mechanism to read the installation_id from the X-GitHub-Installation-ID header, which is easily manipulated by an attacker. The patch removes this insecure fallback. The identified vulnerable functions are the service methods that contained the flawed logic and the router handlers that processed the untrusted input.

Vulnerable functions

Service.CompleteGitHubConnection

internal/api/github_connect.go

This function processed the completion of a GitHub connection. It was vulnerable because it trusted the `installation_id` provided in the request body without verifying that the user initiating the connection had ownership of that installation. This allowed an attacker to link their workspace to a victim's GitHub App installation and access their private repositories.

Service.CompleteGitHubConnector

internal/api/github_connect.go

This is the feature-flagged V2 version of the connection logic. It shared the same IDOR vulnerability as `CompleteGitHubConnection`, where it accepted a client-supplied `installation_id` without proper ownership verification, allowing an attacker to access another tenant's resources.

registerTenancyRoutes handler for POST /v1/connectors/github/complete

internal/api/router.go

This route handler contained vulnerable logic that would fall back to reading the `installation_id` from the `X-GitHub-Installation-ID` HTTP header if it was not present in the JSON body. This header is fully attacker-controlled, providing a direct way to inject a malicious `installation_id` and exploit the IDOR in the downstream `CompleteGitHubConnector` function.

registerTenancyRoutes handler for POST /v1/workspaces/:workspace_id/projects/:project_id/github/connect/complete