Impact
Capacitor's WebView navigation guard validated only the host and scheme of a
target URL, not its path. Because the internal HTTP proxy path
(/_capacitor_http_interceptor_) is served at the application's own origin, a
frame navigation to it was always treated as in-app navigation and allowed.
Loading that path as a document caused the native layer to fetch an arbitrary,
caller-specified URL and return the response body to the WebView at the app's
own origin. Script in that response then ran with full same-origin trust:
access to localStorage, cookies, and every native capability the application
exposes through its registered Capacitor plugins.
The proxy handler was additionally served regardless of whether the
CapacitorHttp plugin was enabled, so applications that never enabled
CapacitorHttp were also affected.
Exploitation requires a victim to activate a link inside the application's
WebView. Any Capacitor application that renders user-controlled or unsanitized
links (chat messages, comments, rich-text content) is a viable delivery surface.
Both Android and iOS are affected.
Patches
Two changes on each platform:
- The navigation guard now blocks frame navigations whose path is the internal
proxy path.
- The proxy handler is served only when
CapacitorHttp is enabled, and never
for a document (main frame) request.
Legitimate CapacitorHttp usage is unaffected. fetch and XMLHttpRequest are
subresource requests and do not pass through the navigation guard.
Upgrade to a patched version, then rebuild and redistribute your application.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, note first that disabling CapacitorHttp
is not sufficient on affected versions, because the proxy path is served
regardless of that setting.