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| Package Name | Ecosystem | Vulnerable Versions | First Patched Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| github.com/tg123/sshpiper | go | >= 1.0.50, < 1.3.0 | 1.3.0 |
Miggo AIRoot Cause AnalysisThe vulnerability stems from the introduction of proxy protocol support in commit 2ddd698, where the main.go file was modified to wrap the network listener with github.com/pires/go-proxyproto.Listener without any access control mechanisms. The critical line d.lis = &proxyproto.Listener{Listener: d.lis} enables proxy protocol parsing for all incoming connections by default, with no IP whitelisting or feature flag to disable it. This violates the proxy protocol spec's requirement that receivers MUST validate source IPs, allowing any client to spoof source addresses. The subsequent fix in 70fb830 adds an --allowed-proxy-addresses flag to implement access controls, confirming this was the vulnerable code path.
