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GHSA-r3r4-g7hq-pq4f

GHSA-r3r4-g7hq-pq4f: CometBFT allows a malicious peer to stall the network by disseminating seemingly valid block parts

Name: ASA-2025-002: Malicious peer can stall network by disseminating seemingly valid block parts Component: CometBFT Criticality: High (Catastrophic Impact; Possible Likelihood per ACMv1.2) Affected versions: <= v0.38.16, v1.0.0 Affected users: Validators, Full nodes, Users

Description

A bug was identified in the CometBFT validation of block part indices and the corresponding proof part indices that can lead to incorrect processing and dissemination of invalid parts, which in turn could lead to a network halt. Additional validation was added to prevent this condition from happening.

Patches

The new CometBFT releases v1.0.1 and v0.38.17 fix this issue.

Unreleased code in the main branch is patched as well.

Workarounds

There are no known workarounds for this issue. If a node is producing these malicious proofs, the only mitigation is to upgrade CometBFT. After upgrading, the validators then will eventually conclude the correct value.

Technical Deep-Dive

When the next proposer creates a block, it is split into many block parts (64kB each). Each block part is then disseminated via p2p layer in a gossip fashion. The block part contains the following fields:

type Part struct {
	Index uint32            `json:"index"`
	Bytes cmtbytes.HexBytes `json:"bytes"`
	Proof merkle.Proof      `json:"proof"`
}

Index - represents the index of a block part
Bytes - the actual content
Proof - Merkle proof, which allows the receiving node to quickly verify that a Part is indeed a piece of the proposed block.

The Proof contains the following fields:

type Proof struct {
	Total    int64    `json:"total"`           // Total number of items.
	Index    int64    `json:"index"`           // Index of item to prove.
	LeafHash []byte   `json:"leaf_hash"`       // Hash of item value.
	Aunts    [][]byte `json:"aunts,omitempty"` // Hashes from leaf's sibling to a root's child.
}

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GHSA-r3r4-g7hq-pq4f

GHSA-r3r4-g7hq-pq4f:

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
github.com/cometbft/cometbft	go	>= 1.0.0-alpha.1, < 1.0.1	1.0.1
github.com/cometbft/cometbft	go	< 0.38.17	0.38.17

Technical Details

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Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability stemmed from missing validation between Part.Index and Proof.Index. The primary fix was adding this check in types.Part.ValidateBasic (as shown in the commit diff). The Go vulnerability report explicitly lists ValidateBasic and PartFromProto as affected symbols. While ValidateBasic is directly responsible for the missing check, PartFromProto's medium confidence stems from its dependency on ValidateBasic for validation during deserialization.

Vulnerable functions

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WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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