8.8

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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GHSA-r2c6-8jc8-g32w

GHSA-r2c6-8jc8-g32w: Duplicate Advisory: 1-Click RCE via Authentication Token Exfiltration From gatewayUrl

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-g8p2-7wf7-98mq. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

OpenClaw (aka clawdbot or Moltbot) before 2026.1.29 obtains a gatewayUrl value from a query string and automatically makes a WebSocket connection without prompting, sending a token value.

(GitHub Advisory)

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GHSA-r2c6-8jc8-g32w

GHSA-r2c6-8jc8-g32w:

8.8

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
clawdbot	npm	< 2026.1.29	2026.1.29

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability, described as '1-Click RCE via Authentication Token Exfiltration From gatewayUrl', allows an attacker to steal a user's authentication token by tricking them into clicking a crafted link. The link contains a 'gatewayUrl' query parameter pointing to an attacker-controlled server.

The analysis of the security patch (commit a7534dc22382c42465f3676724536a014ce0cbf7) reveals that the vulnerability lies in the frontend UI code, specifically in how it handles the gatewayUrl from the URL.

The key file changed is ui/src/ui/app-settings.ts. The function applySettingsFromUrl is responsible for parsing the settings from the URL. Prior to the patch, this function would immediately apply the gatewayUrl from the query parameter by calling applySettings. This would trigger an automatic WebSocket connection to the new URL, sending the user's authentication token along with it.

The patch mitigates this by changing the behavior of applySettingsFromUrl. Instead of directly applying the new gatewayUrl, it stores it in a pendingGatewayUrl variable. A new UI confirmation modal (renderGatewayUrlConfirmation) is introduced, which prompts the user to confirm the change. Only after the user's confirmation, in the handleGatewayUrlConfirm function, is the new gateway URL applied and a connection established.

Therefore, the vulnerable function is applySettingsFromUrl as it was the entry point for the malicious input (gatewayUrl) and the trigger for the automatic connection that led to the token exfiltration.

Vulnerable functions

applySettingsFromUrl

ui/src/ui/app-settings.ts

The function `applySettingsFromUrl` in `ui/src/ui/app-settings.ts` is vulnerable because it processes the `gatewayUrl` from the URL query string. Before the patch, it would directly call `applySettings` with the new URL. This would cause the application to automatically establish a WebSocket connection to the provided URL, sending the authentication token. An attacker could craft a malicious link with a `gatewayUrl` pointing to their server to steal the token.

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

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WAF Protection Rules

WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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