Summary
shell-env fallback trusted prefix-based executable paths for $SHELL, allowing execution of attacker-controlled binaries in local/runtime-env influence scenarios.
Details
In affected versions, shell selection accepted either:
- a shell listed in
/etc/shells, or
- any executable under hardcoded trusted prefixes (
/bin, /usr/bin, /usr/local/bin, /opt/homebrew/bin, /run/current-system/sw/bin).
The selected shell was then executed as a login shell (-l -c 'env -0') for PATH/environment probing.
On systems where a trusted-prefix directory is writable (for example common Homebrew layouts under /opt/homebrew/bin) and runtime $SHELL can be influenced, this enabled attacker-controlled binary execution in OpenClaw process context.
The fix removes the trusted-prefix executable fallback and now trusts only shells explicitly registered in /etc/shells; otherwise it falls back to /bin/sh.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw (npm)
- Affected versions:
>= 2026.2.22, <= 2026.2.22-2
- Latest published vulnerable version:
2026.2.22-2
- Patched versions (released):
>= 2026.2.23
Fix Commit(s)
ff10fe8b91670044a6bb0cd85deb736a0ec8fb55
Release Process Note
This advisory sets patched_versions to the released version (2026.2.23).
This advisory now reflects released fix version 2026.2.23.
OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.