N/A

CVSS Score

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

Concerned about an active attack path?

Talk to our security experts and see Miggo in action.

Miggo Vulnerability Database

→

GHSA-jq3f-vjww-8rq7

GHSA-jq3f-vjww-8rq7: OpenClaw Telegram webhook request bodies were read before secret validation, enabling unauthenticated resource exhaustion

Summary

openclaw versions <= 2026.3.12 read and buffered Telegram webhook request bodies before validating x-telegram-bot-api-secret-token. This let unauthenticated callers force up to the configured webhook body limit of pre-auth body I/O and JSON parse work per request.

Affected Packages / Versions

Package: openclaw (npm)
Affected versions: <= 2026.3.12
Fixed version: 2026.3.13

Details

The vulnerable path was the standalone Telegram webhook listener in src/telegram/webhook.ts. In affected releases, the request handler accepted POST requests, called readJsonBodyWithLimit(...), and only then checked the Telegram secret header. Because the secret validation happened after body reading, an unauthenticated caller could make the server spend memory, socket time, and JSON parse work on requests that should have been rejected before any body processing.

This issue is in scope under OpenClaw's trust model because the Telegram webhook endpoint accepts untrusted network traffic and the secret header is the authentication boundary for that ingress path.

Fix

openclaw@2026.3.13 validates the Telegram webhook secret before any body I/O. Current code reads the header, rejects invalid requests immediately with 401, and only calls readJsonBodyWithLimit(...) after hasValidTelegramWebhookSecret(...) succeeds.

Regression coverage exists in src/telegram/webhook.test.ts (rejects unauthenticated requests before reading the request body).

Fix Commit(s)

7e49e98f79073b11134beac27fdff547ba5a4a02

Thanks @space08 for reporting.

(GitHub Advisory)

Miggo Vulnerability Database

→

GHSA-jq3f-vjww-8rq7

GHSA-jq3f-vjww-8rq7:

N/A

CVSS Score

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

Is this CVE running in your environment?

Easily map the attack path and prioritize which CVEs are a threat to your organization

Validate Exposure

Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
openclaw	npm	<= 2026.3.12	2026.3.13

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability, as described in the advisory, is that the Telegram webhook listener reads the request body before validating the authentication secret. The provided commit patch 7e49e98f79073b11134beac27fdff547ba5a4a02 clearly shows the fix in src/telegram/webhook.ts. The logic inside the startTelegramWebhook function, specifically within the createServer callback, was changed. Originally, readJsonBodyWithLimit was called, and only afterward was the x-telegram-bot-api-secret-token header processed. The patch introduces a check for the secret header before calling readJsonBodyWithLimit. Therefore, the startTelegramWebhook function is the identifiable entry point containing the vulnerable logic where unauthenticated requests were improperly handled, leading to resource exhaustion.

Vulnerable functions

startTelegramWebhook

src/telegram/webhook.ts

The `startTelegramWebhook` function creates an HTTP server to handle Telegram webhooks. The vulnerability lies in the request handler logic within this function. Before the patch, the server would read and parse the JSON request body using `readJsonBodyWithLimit` before it validated the `x-telegram-bot-api-secret-token` header. This allowed an unauthenticated attacker to force the server to process potentially large request bodies, leading to excessive resource consumption (CPU and memory) and a potential denial-of-service. The fix reorders these operations, ensuring the secret token is validated before any body processing occurs.

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Unlock WAF rules for this CVE

Generate vendor-ready rules for the observed attack patterns, plus reasoning and safe deployment guidance

Get WAF rules

WAF Protection Rules

WAF Rule

W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.

Reasoning

*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.