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GHSA-jjw7-3vjf-fg5j

GHSA-jjw7-3vjf-fg5j: OpenClaw Nostr privateKey config redaction bypass leaks plaintext signing key via config.get

Summary

OpenClaw Nostr privateKey config redaction bypass leaks plaintext signing key via config.get

Current Maintainer Triage

Status: open
Normalized severity: medium
Assessment: v2026.3.28 still models Nostr privateKey as plain string so config views can expose it, and the secret-schema fix is unreleased.

Affected Packages / Versions

Package: openclaw (npm)
Latest published npm version: 2026.3.31
Vulnerable version range: <=2026.3.28
Patched versions: >= 2026.3.31
First stable tag containing the fix: v2026.3.31

Fix Commit(s)

57700d716f660591fb6e09727f3ca8041fa48b9d — 2026-03-31T19:55:03+09:00

Release Process Note

The fix is already present in released version 2026.3.31.
This draft looks ready for final maintainer disposition or publication, not additional code-fix work.

Thanks @ccreater222 for reporting.

(GitHub Advisory)

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GHSA-jjw7-3vjf-fg5j

GHSA-jjw7-3vjf-fg5j:

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
openclaw	npm	<= 2026.3.28	2026.3.31

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability lies in the handling of the Nostr private key within the OpenClaw configuration. The key was stored as a plaintext string (privateKey: z.string().optional()) and was not properly redacted when the configuration was accessed or displayed. The analysis of the patch commit 57700d716f660591fb6e09727f3ca8041fa48b9d reveals that several functions were directly accessing this sensitive value.

The root cause was the inadequate configuration schema and the lack of a redaction mechanism for this specific secret. The fix involved two main parts:

Changing the configuration schema for channels.nostr.privateKey from a simple string to a SecretInput type. This is evident in extensions/nostr/src/config-schema.ts.
Adding a generic pattern /private.?key/i to the list of sensitive patterns in src/config/schema.hints.ts, which is used by the configuration snapshot redaction logic to automatically hide sensitive fields.

The identified vulnerable functions, resolveNostrAccount and nostrSetupWizard.credentials.inspect, are points in the code where the unredacted private key was directly accessed. resolveNostrAccount used the key to derive a public key, and in the process, made the raw key available within the resolved account object. The inspect function explicitly returned the key's value for UI purposes. An attacker with access to configuration views or logs containing the output of these functions could have retrieved the plaintext Nostr private key.

Vulnerable functions

resolveNostrAccount

extensions/nostr/src/types.ts

The `resolveNostrAccount` function directly accessed the `privateKey` from the configuration as a plaintext string. This function is used to resolve the full account details, and any subsequent exposure of the object it returns would leak the private key. The patch changes this to process the key as a `SecretInput`, using `normalizeSecretInputString` to safely access the value only when needed.

nostrSetupWizard.credentials.inspect

extensions/nostr/src/setup-surface.ts

The `inspect` function within the `nostrSetupWizard` is used by the setup UI to display the current configuration status. Before the patch, it returned the raw `privateKey` string as the `resolvedValue`, which would then be displayed in the UI, exposing the secret to anyone who could view that configuration page.

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WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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