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GHSA-jj6q-rrrf-h66h

GHSA-jj6q-rrrf-h66h: OpenClaw: Shared-secret comparison call sites leaked length information through timing

Summary

Before OpenClaw 2026.4.2, several shared-secret comparison call sites still used early length-mismatch checks instead of the shared fixed-length comparison helper. Those paths could leak secret-length information through measurable timing differences.

Impact

The affected paths exposed a low-severity timing side channel on secret comparison. The issue did not by itself demonstrate auth bypass, but it weakened the intended constant-time handling for shared secrets.

Affected Packages / Versions

Package: openclaw (npm)
Affected versions: <= 2026.4.1
Patched versions: >= 2026.4.2
Latest published npm version: 2026.4.1

Fix Commit(s)

be10ecef770a4654519869c3641bbb91087c8c7b — reuse the shared secret comparison helper at affected call sites

Release Process Note

The fix is present on main and is staged for OpenClaw 2026.4.2. Publish this advisory after the 2026.4.2 npm release is live.

Thanks @kexinoh of Tencent zhuque Lab (https://github.com/Tencent/AI-Infra-Guard) for reporting.

(GitHub Advisory)

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GHSA-jj6q-rrrf-h66h

GHSA-jj6q-rrrf-h66h:

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
openclaw	npm	<= 2026.4.1	2026.4.2

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability lies in multiple locations across the OpenClaw codebase where shared secrets are compared. The issue is a timing side-channel vulnerability (CWE-208) caused by insecure implementations of secret comparison logic. In several webhook handlers and utility functions (for BlueBubbles, Feishu, Mattermost, Telegram, Twilio, and Zalo), the code first checks if the length of the user-provided secret matches the length of the stored secret. If the lengths do not match, the function returns immediately. This early exit creates a measurable time difference between requests with correct-length secrets and those with incorrect-length secrets. An attacker can abuse this behavior to incrementally guess the length of a valid secret. The patch addresses this by replacing all the ad-hoc, vulnerable comparison implementations with a single, shared safeEqualSecret helper function that performs a constant-time comparison, thus mitigating the timing leak.

Vulnerable functions

safeEqualSecret

extensions/bluebubbles/src/monitor.ts

The function `safeEqualSecret` in `extensions/bluebubbles/src/monitor.ts` was vulnerable to a timing attack. It would first compare the lengths of the two secrets and return early if they did not match. This behavior allows an attacker to determine the length of the secret by measuring the response time of the server.

timingSafeEqualString

extensions/feishu/src/monitor.transport.ts

The function `timingSafeEqualString` in `extensions/feishu/src/monitor.transport.ts` was vulnerable to a timing attack. It compared the lengths of the input strings and returned immediately if they were different, leaking information about the secret's length.

verifyInteractionToken

extensions/mattermost/src/mattermost/interactions.ts

The `verifyInteractionToken` function in `extensions/mattermost/src/mattermost/interactions.ts` had an in-line length check before performing a timing-safe comparison. This premature exit on length mismatch creates a timing side-channel.

hasValidTelegramWebhookSecret

extensions/telegram/src/webhook.ts

The `hasValidTelegramWebhookSecret` function in `extensions/telegram/src/webhook.ts` used a non-constant time comparison by checking the length of the secret before the actual comparison. This leaks the length of the secret.

TwilioProvider.validateRequest

extensions/voice-call/src/providers/twilio.ts

A method within the `TwilioProvider` class, likely part of the `validateRequest` flow, was vulnerable to a timing attack. It performed a length check on the authentication token and returned early if the lengths differed, which could be exploited to find the token's length.

timingSafeEqual

extensions/voice-call/src/webhook-security.ts

The `timingSafeEqual` helper function in `extensions/voice-call/src/webhook-security.ts` was flawed. Despite an attempt to maintain constant time, it returned early if the input string lengths were different, creating a timing leak.

timingSafeEqualString

extensions/voice-call/src/webhook-security.ts

Similar to the `timingSafeEqual` function in the same file, `timingSafeEqualString` was also vulnerable to a timing attack due to an early return on length mismatch.

timingSafeEquals

extensions/zalo/src/monitor.webhook.ts

The `timingSafeEquals` function in `extensions/zalo/src/monitor.webhook.ts` was vulnerable. It checked the length of the buffers and returned early if they were not equal, leaking information about the secret's length via a timing side-channel.

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WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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