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GHSA-j424-mc44-f4hj

GHSA-j424-mc44-f4hj: Duplicate Advisory: Picklescan Bypass is Possible via File Extension Mismatch

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-jgw4-cr84-mqxg. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

An Improper Input Validation vulnerability in the scanning logic of mmaitre314 picklescan versions up to and including 0.0.30 allows a remote attacker to bypass pickle files security checks by supplying a standard pickle file with a PyTorch-related file extension. When the pickle file incorrectly considered safe is loaded, it can lead to the execution of malicious code.

(GitHub Advisory)

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GHSA-j424-mc44-f4hj

GHSA-j424-mc44-f4hj:

N/A

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
picklescan	pip	< 0.0.31	0.0.31

Technical Details

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Root Cause Analysis

The analysis of the provided vulnerability information and the associated patch confirms that the vulnerability is located in the scan_bytes function within src/picklescan/scanner.py. The vulnerability is a classic case of improper input validation, where the file extension is used to determine the initial parsing strategy. The flaw was in the handling of parsing failures. Specifically, when a file with a PyTorch extension failed the PyTorch-specific magic number check, the scan was aborted. An attacker could exploit this by naming a malicious pickle file with a .bin or other PyTorch-associated extension. The picklescan tool would attempt to parse it as a PyTorch model, fail, and then stop, never proceeding to the general-purpose pickle scanning that would have identified the threat. The patch corrects this by changing the error handling. Instead of aborting, the code now catches the InvalidMagicError, issues a warning, and then allows the file to be processed by the other scanning functions (for zip, 7z, and raw pickle formats). This ensures that even if the initial file type assumption based on the extension is wrong, the file is still thoroughly checked for other potentially malicious formats.

Vulnerable functions

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WAF Protection Rules

WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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