Summary
A specially crafted nonce routes unauthenticated requests through the NoEncoder path, where startSessionHandler() reads the entire request body without limits, allowing attacker-driven memory exhaustion and process crash.
Details
server/encoders/encoders.go: EncoderFromNonce() returns NoEncoder when nonce % 65537 == 0 (lines 254-264); NoEncoder is a passthrough (util/encoders/nop.go:22-32).server/c2/http.go: anonymousHandler() routes requests with any encoder (including NoEncoder) to startSessionHandler() (lines 551-562).server/c2/http.go: startSessionHandler() uses io.ReadAll(req.Body) without a size cap (lines 564-643), unlike the authenticated path that uses io.LimitedReader (readReqBody(), lines 708-732).
PoC
An attacker could send an HTTP POST with a nonce that is a multiple of 65537 (e.g., ?q=65537) so it is handled by startSessionHandler() with a NoEncoder, and advertise a very large Content-Length while streaming data. Because this handler uses io.ReadAll(req.Body) without a size limit, the server is expected to allocate large amounts of memory and may exhaust available RAM, leading to process termination on typical deployments.
Impact
Unauthenticated remote DoS: attacker can crash the Sliver HTTP listener, dropping all active sessions and locking out operators until restart. No credentials or non-default config required.
Miggo AI