3.7

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3.1

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GHSA-gcj7-r3hg-m7w6

GHSA-gcj7-r3hg-m7w6: OpenClaw's voice-call Twilio replay dedupe now bound to authenticated webhook identity

Summary

The voice-call Twilio webhook path accepted replay/dedupe identity from unsigned request metadata (i-twilio-idempotency-token), enabling replayed signed requests to bypass replay detection and manager dedupe by mutating only that header.

Affected Packages / Versions

Package: openclaw (npm)
Affected versions: <= 2026.2.25 (latest published npm version at triage time)
Fixed on main: commit 1aadf26f9acc399affabd859937a09468a9c5cb4
Planned patched npm version: 2026.2.26

Impact

Deployments using the optional voice-call Twilio webhook path could accept replayed webhook events as fresh events when an attacker had one valid signed request and changed only the unsigned idempotency header.

Technical Details

The fix removes unsigned-header trust from Twilio replay/dedupe identity and binds replay/manager dedupe to authenticated request material. It also threads a verified request identity through provider parsing so dedupe uses verification-derived identity rather than mutable headers.

Fix Commit(s)

1aadf26f9acc399affabd859937a09468a9c5cb4

Release Process Note

patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next release (2026.2.26). After the npm release is published, this advisory can be published without additional version-field edits.

OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

(GitHub Advisory)

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GHSA-gcj7-r3hg-m7w6

GHSA-gcj7-r3hg-m7w6:

3.7

CVSS Score

3.1

-

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
openclaw	npm	<= 2026.2.25	2026.2.26

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
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Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability lies in the improper trust of the i-twilio-idempotency-token HTTP header for deduplication and replay prevention of Twilio webhooks. This header is not part of the signed data from Twilio, allowing an attacker to capture a valid, signed webhook request and replay it multiple times by simply modifying the value of this header. The application would then process these replayed requests as new, unique events.

The analysis of the patch 1aadf26f9acc399affabd859937a09468a9c5cb4 reveals that the core of the vulnerability is in two helper functions: createTwilioRequestDedupeKey in extensions/voice-call/src/providers/twilio.ts and createTwilioReplayKey in extensions/voice-call/src/webhook-security.ts. Both of these functions explicitly read the i-twilio-idempotency-token header and used its value to generate a key for replay and duplicate checking.

The fix involves removing this logic and instead creating a verifiedRequestKey based on cryptographically signed components of the request, such as the signature, URL, and request parameters. This new, verified key is now generated in verifyTwilioWebhook and passed through the system, including to TwilioProvider.parseWebhookEvent, ensuring that the deduplication is tied to the authenticated request material.

The identified vulnerable functions are the ones that either directly contained the flawed logic (createTwilioRequestDedupeKey, createTwilioReplayKey) or were part of the call chain that relied on this flawed logic (verifyTwilioWebhook, TwilioProvider.parseWebhookEvent, and the main webhook handler VoiceCallWebhookServer.handleWebhook).

Vulnerable functions

createTwilioRequestDedupeKey

extensions/voice-call/src/providers/twilio.ts

This function was responsible for creating a deduplication key for incoming Twilio webhooks. It incorrectly trusted the `i-twilio-idempotency-token` header, which is not signed and can be controlled by an attacker. This allowed an attacker to replay signed requests by simply changing this header, bypassing replay detection.

TwilioProvider.parseWebhookEvent

extensions/voice-call/src/providers/twilio.ts

This function, part of the Twilio provider, uses the vulnerable `createTwilioRequestDedupeKey` function to generate a deduplication key. By doing so, it incorporates the flawed logic of trusting an unsigned header, making it a key component in the vulnerability chain.

createTwilioReplayKey

extensions/voice-call/src/webhook-security.ts

Similar to `createTwilioRequestDedupeKey`, this function created a replay key based on the `i-twilio-idempotency-token` header. This function is called during webhook verification and is the core of the replay protection bypass vulnerability.

verifyTwilioWebhook

extensions/voice-call/src/webhook-security.ts

This function is responsible for verifying the authenticity and freshness of incoming Twilio webhooks. It used the vulnerable `createTwilioReplayKey` function, making it susceptible to replay attacks where an attacker could bypass the replay detection mechanism.

VoiceCallWebhookServer.handleWebhook

extensions/voice-call/src/webhook.ts

This function is the main entry point for handling incoming webhooks. It orchestrates the calls to `verifyWebhook` and `parseWebhookEvent` on the provider. As such, it is the top-level function in the stack trace that would be observed when the vulnerability is triggered. The patch modifies this function to pass the `verifiedRequestKey` from the verification step to the parsing step, which is a key part of the fix.

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WAF Rule

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3.7

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GHSA-gcj7-r3hg-m7w6: OpenClaw's voice-call Twilio replay dedupe now bound to authenticated webhook identity

Summary

Affected Packages / Versions

Impact

Technical Details

Fix Commit(s)

Release Process Note

GHSA-gcj7-r3hg-m7w6:

3.7

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Technical Details

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Vulnerable functions

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Vulnerable functions

GHSA-gcj7-r3hg-m7w6: OpenClaw's voice-call Twilio replay dedupe now bound to authenticated webhook identity

Summary

Affected Packages / Versions

Impact

Technical Details

Fix Commit(s)

Release Process Note

3.7

3.7

Technical Details

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