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GHSA-fh32-73r9-rgh5

GHSA-fh32-73r9-rgh5: OpenClaw: Trailing-dot localhost CDP hosts could bypass remote loopback protections

Summary

Before OpenClaw 2026.4.2, remote CDP discovery could return a trailing-dot localhost host such as localhost. and bypass OpenClaw's loopback-host normalization. That let a non-loopback remote CDP profile pivot the follow-up connection back onto localhost.

Impact

A hostile discovery response could retarget authenticated browser control toward a localhost-resolving endpoint on the OpenClaw host. This weakened the existing remote-CDP loopback protection and could expose localhost-backed browser state.

Affected Packages / Versions

Package: openclaw (npm)
Affected versions: <= 2026.4.1
Patched versions: >= 2026.4.2
Latest published npm version: 2026.4.1

Fix Commit(s)

9c22d636697336a6b22b0ae24798d8b8325d7828 — normalize localhost absolute-form CDP hosts before loopback checks

Release Process Note

The fix is present on main and is staged for OpenClaw 2026.4.2. Publish this advisory after the 2026.4.2 npm release is live.

Thanks @smaeljaish771 for reporting.

(GitHub Advisory)

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GHSA-fh32-73r9-rgh5

GHSA-fh32-73r9-rgh5:

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
openclaw	npm	<= 2026.4.1	2026.4.2

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability exists in the openclaw package's handling of CDP (Chrome DevTools Protocol) hostnames. Specifically, the code did not account for trailing dots in hostnames when checking for loopback addresses. An attacker could provide a hostname like localhost. which would resolve to localhost but bypass the application's security checks.

The patch in src/gateway/net.ts addresses this by modifying the parseHostForAddressChecks function. The updated code now removes any trailing dots from the hostname before comparing it to 'localhost'. This ensures that variations of 'localhost' are correctly identified as loopback addresses.

The test file extensions/browser/src/browser/cdp.test.ts includes a new test case that confirms the fix, showing that a websocket URL with localhost. is correctly rewritten. This indicates that the normalizeCdpWsUrl function, which likely uses parseHostForAddressChecks, is now secure against this bypass. The core of the vulnerability, however, lies in the parseHostForAddressChecks function's improper input validation.

Vulnerable functions

parseHostForAddressChecks

src/gateway/net.ts

The function `parseHostForAddressChecks` is vulnerable because it fails to properly normalize hostnames before checking if they are 'localhost'. The original code compares the lowercased hostname directly to 'localhost'. This means a hostname like 'localhost.' would not be considered a loopback address, allowing an attacker to bypass security checks that prevent connections to localhost.

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WAF Protection Rules

WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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