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GHSA-cmfr-9m2r-xwhq

GHSA-cmfr-9m2r-xwhq: OpenClaw `node.invoke(browser.proxy)` bypasses `browser.request` persistent profile-mutation guard

Impact

OpenClaw node.invoke(browser.proxy) bypasses browser.request persistent profile-mutation guard.

node.invoke(browser.proxy) could mutate persistent browser profiles through a path that bypassed the browser.request guard.

OpenClaw is a user-controlled local assistant. This advisory is scoped to the OpenClaw trust model and does not assume a multi-tenant service boundary.

Affected Packages / Versions

Package: openclaw (npm)
Affected versions: <= v2026.04.01
Patched versions: 2026.4.8

Fix

The issue was fixed on main and is available in the patched npm version listed above. The verified fixed tree is commit d7c3210cd6f5fdfdc1beff4c9541673e814354d5.

Verification

The fix was re-checked against main before publication, including targeted regression tests for the affected security boundary.

Credits

Thanks @nicky-cc of Tencent zhuque Lab (https://github.com/Tencent/AI-Infra-Guard) for reporting.

(GitHub Advisory)

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GHSA-cmfr-9m2r-xwhq

GHSA-cmfr-9m2r-xwhq:

N/A

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
openclaw	npm	< 2026.4.8	2026.4.8

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability, described as 'OpenClaw node.invoke(browser.proxy) bypasses browser.request persistent profile-mutation guard', is addressed in commit d7c3210cd6f5fdfdc1beff4c9541673e814354d5. The patch modifies the fetchWithSsrFGuard function in src/infra/net/fetch-guard.ts. The change involves moving the DNS pinning logic, which calls resolvePinnedHostnameWithPolicy. Previously, DNS pinning was executed before checking if a trusted environment proxy was configured. This meant that even if a proxy was intended to be used (as in the case of browser.proxy), the request's destination was pinned to a resolved IP address, effectively bypassing the proxy. This bypass could allow for unauthorized network requests, defeating the purpose of the security guard. The fix ensures that DNS pinning is skipped when TRUSTED_ENV_PROXY mode is active and a proxy is configured, correctly routing traffic through the proxy. The vulnerable function is therefore fetchWithSsrFGuard as it contained the flawed logic that could be triggered during exploitation.

Vulnerable functions

fetchWithSsrFGuard

src/infra/net/fetch-guard.ts

The vulnerability lies in the `fetchWithSsrFGuard` function, where DNS pinning was performed unconditionally before checking for a trusted proxy configuration. This could cause requests to bypass the intended proxy and be sent directly to the pinned IP address, leading to a security guard bypass. The fix defers the DNS pinning to only occur when a trusted proxy is not in use.

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WAF Protection Rules

WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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