9.8

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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GHSA-cjg8-85gj-v9q2

GHSA-cjg8-85gj-v9q2: Duplicate Advisory: OpenClaw: Feishu webhook and card-action validation now fail closed

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-xh72-v6v9-mwhc. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

OpenClaw before 2026.4.15 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in Feishu webhook and card-action validation that allows unauthenticated requests to reach command dispatch. Missing encryptKey configuration and blank callback tokens fail open instead of rejecting requests, enabling attackers to bypass signature verification and replay protection to execute arbitrary commands.

(GitHub Advisory)

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GHSA-cjg8-85gj-v9q2

GHSA-cjg8-85gj-v9q2:

9.8

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
openclaw	npm	< 2026.4.15	2026.4.15

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability lies in the improper handling of authentication and authorization in OpenClaw's Feishu integration. Specifically, the application failed to enforce security checks when certain configurations were missing, leading to a fail-open state. The analysis of the patch commit c8003f1b33ed2924be5f62131bd28742c5a41aae reveals two primary weaknesses that were addressed:

Webhook Signature Bypass: The isFeishuWebhookSignatureValid function in extensions/feishu/src/monitor.transport.ts would incorrectly return true if the encryptKey was not provided. This allowed an attacker to bypass signature verification by simply not providing a signature. The monitorWebhook function, which sets up the webhook listener, also failed to enforce the presence of this key, allowing the application to start in this insecure state.
Blank Token Acceptance in Card Actions: The beginFeishuCardActionToken function in extensions/feishu/src/card-action.ts treated blank or empty tokens as valid. This logic error was exploited in the handleFeishuCardAction function, which processed these tokens without proper validation, allowing for unauthorized actions and replay attacks.

The identified vulnerable functions are the ones that directly implemented this flawed logic. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities to send unauthenticated requests to the command dispatch, potentially leading to arbitrary command execution.

Vulnerable functions

isFeishuWebhookSignatureValid

extensions/feishu/src/monitor.transport.ts

The function `isFeishuWebhookSignatureValid` in `extensions/feishu/src/monitor.transport.ts` was vulnerable because it would return `true` if the `encryptKey` was missing. This would effectively bypass signature validation for Feishu webhooks, allowing an attacker to send unauthenticated requests.

monitorWebhook

extensions/feishu/src/monitor.transport.ts

The function `monitorWebhook` in `extensions/feishu/src/monitor.transport.ts` was vulnerable because it did not enforce the presence of an `encryptKey`. This allowed the webhook to run in an insecure mode where signature validation was bypassed. The patch adds a check to ensure an `encryptKey` is configured.

beginFeishuCardActionToken

extensions/feishu/src/card-action.ts

The function `beginFeishuCardActionToken` in `extensions/feishu/src/card-action.ts` was vulnerable as it returned `true` for a blank or empty token, effectively treating it as a valid, already-processed token. This allowed replay attacks or unauthorized actions.

handleFeishuCardAction

extensions/feishu/src/card-action.ts

The function `handleFeishuCardAction` in `extensions/feishu/src/card-action.ts` was vulnerable because it did not validate the presence of a token in the card action event. This allowed events with blank tokens to be processed, leading to an authentication bypass. The patch adds a check to reject events with empty tokens.

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

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WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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