Summary
Three weaknesses in Nuxt's client-navigation URL handling, all reachable
from documented public APIs (navigateTo and reloadNuxtApp):
-
SSR open redirect in navigateTo via path-normalisation bypass.
navigateTo decided whether a target was external by inspecting the raw
input with hasProtocol(..., { acceptRelative: true }). Inputs such as
/..//evil.com, /.//evil.com, /%2e%2e//evil.com, or
/app/..//evil.com slipped past that check because they start with
/, but WHATWG URL parsing then normalised them to the
protocol-relative pathname //evil.com. The normalised value was
written to the Location response header and into the
<meta http-equiv="refresh"> body of the SSR redirect page, so a
victim's browser would resolve the redirect cross-origin to the
attacker's host.
-
Client-side script execution via navigateTo({ open: ... }). The
client-side early-open handler called window.open(toPath, ...) without
applying the isScriptProtocol check that gates the normal navigateTo
path. A target of javascript:... (or another script-capable scheme)
passed to navigateTo(url, { open: { ... } }) therefore executed in the
application's origin instead of being rejected.
-
Open redirect in reloadNuxtApp via protocol-relative bypass.
reloadNuxtApp({ path }) rejects script-capable protocols by parsing
the path with new URL(path, window.location.href) and checking the
resolved protocol against isScriptProtocol. Protocol-relative paths
such as //evil.com resolve to the current page's protocol (https:),
which passes that check; the value is then assigned to
window.location.href, which the browser treats as a cross-origin
redirect. This is the same protocol-relative bypass family as (1), in
a different sink.
Impact
For (1), the practical risk is phishing or OAuth-code theft against any
Nuxt app that forwards user-controlled input (for example a ?next=
query parameter on a login route) into navigateTo on the server. The
framework documents that navigateTo blocks external hosts unless
external: true is passed, so maintainers commonly rely on it as the
safe path for post-login redirects.
For (2), any app that passes a user-controlled URL into
navigateTo(url, { open: { ... } }) was vulnerable to reflected XSS in
the application's first-party origin.
For (3), any app that forwards user-controlled input into
reloadNuxtApp({ path }) could be redirected cross-origin for phishing
or OAuth-code theft, even on releases that already shipped the
isScriptProtocol guard added by #35115.
Patches
Fixed in nuxt@4.4.7 and backported to nuxt@3.21.7. The three sinks
are addressed by:
- Path-normalisation bypass in
navigateTo:
navigateTo({ open }) script-protocol guard:
- Protocol-relative bypass in
reloadNuxtApp:
Workarounds
- For (1): validate redirect targets before passing them to
navigateTo,
for example reject any input where
new URL(target, 'http://localhost').pathname starts with //, or
only accept a known allow-list of paths.
- For (2): reject any user-controlled URL whose protocol is not in an
allow-list (typically just
http: and https:) before passing it to
navigateTo({ open: ... }).
- For (3): same shape as (1). Reject paths starting with
// (or where
new URL(path, window.location.href).host !== window.location.host)
before passing to reloadNuxtApp({ path }).
References
- CWE-601: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')
- CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
Credits
Reported by Anthropic / Claude as ANT-2026-S08HN6DH through Anthropic's
coordinated vulnerability disclosure programme.
The reloadNuxtApp protocol-relative bypass (sink 3) was independently
reported by @alcls01111 via GitHub's
coordinated disclosure flow (GHSA-w7fp-2cfv-4837), closed as a
duplicate of this advisory.