7.7

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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GHSA-3r56-7hhr-vfg9

GHSA-3r56-7hhr-vfg9: Duplicate Advisory: OpenClaw: CDP /json/version WebSocket URL could pivot to untrusted second-hop targets

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-f7fh-qg34-x2xh. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

OpenClaw before 2026.4.5 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the CDP /json/version WebSocket endpoint that allows attackers to pivot to untrusted second-hop targets. The webSocketDebuggerUrl response field is not properly validated, enabling attackers to redirect connections to arbitrary hosts and perform SSRF-style attacks.

(GitHub Advisory)

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GHSA-3r56-7hhr-vfg9

GHSA-3r56-7hhr-vfg9:

7.7

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
openclaw	npm	< 2026.4.5	2026.4.5

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The analysis of the provided commit bc356cc8c2beaa747c71dd86cceab8f804699665 reveals a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the openclaw package. The root cause of the vulnerability lies in the createTargetViaCdp function located in extensions/browser/src/browser/cdp.ts.

The vulnerability description indicates that the webSocketDebuggerUrl is not properly validated. The code patch confirms this. Specifically, when the cdpUrl parameter passed to createTargetViaCdp is a WebSocket URL (e.g., starting with ws:// or wss://), the function would proceed to use this URL directly without checking if it complies with the application's SSRF policy. An attacker could exploit this by crafting a request with a malicious WebSocket URL, causing the application server to initiate a connection to an unintended and potentially malicious destination.

The patch addresses this vulnerability by adding a validation step. The line await assertCdpEndpointAllowed(opts.cdpUrl, opts.ssrfPolicy); is inserted to ensure that any direct WebSocket URL is first validated against the defined SSRF policy before being used. The associated test file changes also confirm this by adding a test case that asserts that a connection to a disallowed private network address is blocked, throwing an SsrFBlockedError.

Vulnerable functions

createTargetViaCdp

extensions/browser/src/browser/cdp.ts

The `createTargetViaCdp` function was vulnerable to a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attack. When a direct WebSocket URL was provided as the `cdpUrl`, the function would use it to establish a connection without proper validation against the configured SSRF policy. This allowed an attacker to specify a malicious WebSocket endpoint, forcing the server to connect to an arbitrary internal or external host. The patch mitigates this by introducing a call to `assertCdpEndpointAllowed` to validate the WebSocket URL before the connection is made.

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

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WAF Protection Rules

WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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