Affected Packages / Versions
This issue affects the optional voice-call plugin only. It is not enabled by default; it only applies to installations where the plugin is installed and enabled.
- Package:
@openclaw/voice-call
- Vulnerable versions:
< 2026.2.3
- Patched versions:
>= 2026.2.3
Legacy package name (if you are still using it):
- Package:
@clawdbot/voice-call
- Vulnerable versions:
<= 2026.1.24
- Patched versions: none published under this package name; migrate to
@openclaw/voice-call
Summary
In certain reverse-proxy / forwarding setups, webhook verification can be bypassed if untrusted forwarded headers are accepted.
Impact
An external party may be able to send voice-call webhook requests that are accepted as valid, which can result in spoofed webhook events being processed.
Root Cause
Some deployments implicitly trusted forwarded headers (for example Forwarded / X-Forwarded-*) when determining request properties used during webhook verification. If those headers are not overwritten by a trusted proxy, a client can supply them directly and influence verification.
Resolution
Ignore forwarded headers by default unless explicitly trusted and allowlisted in configuration. Keep any loopback-only development bypass restricted to local development only. Upgrade to a patched version.
If you cannot upgrade immediately, strip Forwarded and X-Forwarded-* headers at the edge so clients cannot supply them directly.
Fix Commit(s)
a749db9820eb6d6224032a5a34223d286d2dcc2f
Credits
Thanks @0x5t for reporting.