Summary
The SAML authentication success handler in Kimai returns the RelayState POST parameter as a redirect destination without validating the host or scheme. After a user successfully authenticates via SAML, they are redirected to an attacker-controlled URL if the IdP includes a malicious RelayState value. This enables phishing attacks that steal credentials or session tokens post-SSO.
Requires SAML to be enabled (non-default configuration).
Details
Vulnerable file: src/Saml/Security/SamlAuthenticationSuccessHandler.php
// Line 27-33
$relayState = $request->request->get('RelayState', $request->query->get('RelayState'));
if (\is_scalar($relayState)) {
$relayState = (string) $relayState;
if ($relayState !== $this->httpUtils->generateUri($request, (string) $this->options['login_path'])) {
return $relayState; // No host/scheme validation — any URL accepted
}
}
The only check is that RelayState does not equal the configured login_path. Any external URL (e.g., https://attacker.com) passes this check and is returned as the redirect destination.
The existing unit test SamlAuthenticationSuccessHandlerTest::testRelayState() confirms this behavior — an absolute URL in RelayState results in a redirect to that URL with no restriction.
Steps to Reproduce
1. Enable SAML authentication in Kimai
2. Configure a SAML IdP (e.g., SimpleSAMLphp)
3. Initiate IdP-initiated SSO with RelayState=https://attacker.com
— or intercept the ACS POST and modify RelayState to https://attacker.com
4. Complete SAML authentication at the IdP
5. Observe: after the SAMLResponse POST to /saml/acs, Kimai issues:
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://attacker.com
Code-confirmed via unit test (testRelayState): onAuthenticationSuccess with RelayState=http://localhost/relayed redirects directly to that URL. External URLs follow the same code path.