N/A

CVSS Score

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

Concerned about an active attack path?

Talk to our security experts and see Miggo in action.

Miggo Vulnerability Database

→

GHSA-2xcp-x87w-q377

GHSA-2xcp-x87w-q377: OpenClaw: Hook mapping templates could bypass hook session-key opt-in

Affected Packages / Versions

Package: openclaw (npm)
Affected versions: < 2026.4.20
Patched version: 2026.4.20

Impact

Templated hook mapping sessionKey values were treated differently from request-supplied session keys. A hook mapping could render an externally influenced session key even when hooks.allowRequestSessionKey was disabled, bypassing the intended routing opt-in for hook callers.

This affects webhook routing isolation. It does not grant host execution by itself. Severity is medium.

Fix

Template-rendered mapping session keys are now treated as externally supplied routing input and require hooks.allowRequestSessionKey=true plus the existing prefix policy checks.

Fix commit:

5275d008ed33203dba3f98e969ad683a65c416c3

Release

Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.4.20.

(GitHub Advisory)

Miggo Vulnerability Database

→

GHSA-2xcp-x87w-q377

GHSA-2xcp-x87w-q377:

N/A

CVSS Score

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

Is this CVE running in your environment?

Easily map the attack path and prioritize which CVEs are a threat to your organization

Validate Exposure

Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
openclaw	npm	< 2026.4.20	2026.4.20

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability lies in the improper handling of session keys generated from templates in hook mappings. The system failed to treat these templated keys as user-influenced input, allowing a bypass of the hooks.allowRequestSessionKey security setting.

The analysis of the patch 5275d008ed33203dba3f98e969ad683a65c416c3 reveals the following:

Root Cause: The resolveHookSessionKey function in src/gateway/hooks.ts only checked the allowRequestSessionKey policy for session keys explicitly coming from a request (source: "request"). It did not apply this check to session keys from mappings (source: "mapping"), even if those mappings used templates that rendered user-provided data.
The Fix: The patch introduces a more granular classification for session key origins: mapping-static and mapping-templated.
- The buildActionFromMapping function in src/gateway/hooks-mapping.ts was modified to inspect the sessionKey for template expressions ({{...}}) and tag it with the appropriate source.
- The resolveHookSessionKey function was then updated to enforce the allowRequestSessionKey policy for both request and mapping-templated sources.
- The main request handler, createHooksRequestHandler in src/gateway/server-http.ts, was updated to pass this new, more precise source information when calling resolveHookSessionKey.
Vulnerable Functions:
- resolveHookSessionKey is the primary vulnerable function as it contained the flawed security logic.
- createHooksRequestHandler is the entry point for a malicious request and would appear in any runtime trace of an exploit.
- buildActionFromMapping and applyHookMappings are also implicated as they are responsible for processing the templates and creating the hook action with the attacker-controlled session key, which was then improperly validated.

An attacker could exploit this by sending a request to a webhook endpoint that uses a mapping with a templated sessionKey (e.g., sessionKey: "hook:{{payload.id}}"). By controlling the payload.id, they could control the session key, bypassing the intended routing isolation, even when hooks.allowRequestSessionKey was set to false.

Vulnerable functions

resolveHookSessionKey

src/gateway/hooks.ts

This function contained the core logic flaw. It was responsible for validating session keys but failed to apply the `allowRequestSessionKey` policy to session keys generated from mapping templates. This allowed a bypass of the intended routing isolation by crafting a payload that would be rendered into a session key by a template.

createHooksRequestHandler

src/gateway/server-http.ts

This function is the main HTTP request handler for hooks. It orchestrates the process of applying hook mappings and validating the resulting session key. An exploit would pass through this function, making it a key indicator in runtime profiles or stack traces.

buildActionFromMapping

src/gateway/hooks-mapping.ts

This function is responsible for creating a hook action from a mapping configuration. Before the patch, it rendered templated session keys without distinguishing them from static ones. This lack of distinction was a root cause of the vulnerability, as downstream functions like `resolveHookSessionKey` could not apply the correct policy.

applyHookMappings

src/gateway/hooks-mapping.ts

This function applies the configured hook mappings to an incoming request. It is on the direct execution path of an exploit, as it's responsible for processing the mapping that contains the vulnerable templated `sessionKey`. It uses the vulnerable `buildActionFromMapping` function to construct the hook action.

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Unlock WAF rules for this CVE

Generate vendor-ready rules for the observed attack patterns, plus reasoning and safe deployment guidance

Get WAF rules

WAF Protection Rules

WAF Rule

W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.

Reasoning

*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.