The vulnerability, as described in CVE-2026-7301, involves the deserialization of untrusted data in SGLang's multimodal scheduler. The analysis of the provided information, particularly the detailed breakdown in the 'antiproof.ai' blog post, pointed to a specific code pattern involving pickle.loads() on data received from a ZMQ socket. By examining the source code of the sgl-project/sglang repository, specifically the python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/managers/scheduler.py file, the Scheduler.recv_reqs function was identified. This function contains the exact vulnerable code snippet mentioned in the security advisory, where it receives a payload from a socket and deserializes it using pickle.loads without any prior validation. This allows for remote code execution. Additionally, the Scheduler.event_loop function was identified as a key component in the execution flow, as it calls recv_reqs to process incoming requests. Therefore, both functions would likely appear in a runtime profile when the vulnerability is triggered.