Summary
execute_code() in praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py (v1.6.37, subprocess sandbox mode) can be fully bypassed using print.__self__ to retrieve the real Python builtins module, from which __import__ can be extracted via vars() and runtime string construction. This achieves arbitrary OS command execution on the host, completely defeating the sandbox.
This is a novel bypass that survives all patches for CVE-2026-39888 (frame traversal), CVE-2026-34938 (str subclass), and CVE-2026-40158 (type.__getattribute__ trampoline).
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H — 9.9 Critical
Root Cause
Three independent gaps in the AST-based security validation:
Gap 1: __self__ missing from _blocked_attrs
In CPython, all built-in functions (C-level functions) have a __self__ attribute that returns the module they belong to. The built-in functions in safe_builtins (print, len, range, etc.) are the real CPython built-in functions, so print.__self__ returns <module 'builtins' (built-in)>.
The _blocked_attrs frozenset (line 52) does NOT include __self__. The AST check at line 74 only blocks attributes that are IN this set, so print.__self__ passes.
Gap 2: vars not blocked as callable or attribute
builtins.vars(obj) returns obj.__dict__. The function name vars is not in the AST Call blocklist (line 83: only blocks exec, eval, compile, __import__, , , , , , ). And is not in for attribute access.