7.7

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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CVE-2026-47260

CVE-2026-47260: Koel Vulnerable to SSRF via Podcast Episode Enclosure URLs

Koel is a free, open-source music streaming solution. Prior to version 9.3.5, Koel validates the podcast feed URL via the SafeUrl rule (DNS resolution + public IP check), but the individual episode <enclosure url="..."> values extracted from the RSS XML are stored directly into the database without any SSRF validation. When a user plays an episode, the server downloads the full HTTP response from the unvalidated enclosure URL via Http::sink()->get() and streams it back to the user, enabling full-read SSRF against internal services. This issue has been patched in version 9.3.5.

(GitHub Advisory)

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CVE-2026-47260

CVE-2026-47260:

7.7

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
phanan/koel	composer	<= 9.3.4	9.3.5

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The core of the vulnerability is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) caused by insufficient validation of URLs sourced from external input. The primary attack vector involves the podcast functionality. The application correctly validates the main podcast feed URL upon subscription. However, it fails to validate the individual episode URLs (enclosure URLs) contained within the feed's XML data.

The App\Services\Podcast\PodcastService::synchronizeEpisodes function would parse the RSS feed and store these unvalidated enclosure URLs directly into the database. When a user attempts to play an episode, the App\Values\Podcast\EpisodePlayable::createForEpisode function is triggered. This function retrieves the stored URL from the database and executes an HTTP request to it, resulting in a full-read SSRF. An attacker can host a malicious RSS feed containing URLs pointing to internal services (e.g., cloud metadata endpoints like 169.254.169.254) to exfiltrate sensitive data.

A secondary, similar SSRF vulnerability was found in the App\Ai\Tools\AddRadioStation::handle function, which is part of a premium feature. This tool accepted a URL to add a radio station but failed to apply any safety checks, again allowing an attacker to specify an internal URL and trigger an SSRF. The patches remediate these issues by consistently applying a SafeUrl validation rule at every point where an external URL is processed: during podcast synchronization, just before episode playback, and within the AI radio station tool.

Vulnerable functions

App\Services\Podcast\PodcastService::synchronizeEpisodes

app/Services/Podcast/PodcastService.php

This function is responsible for parsing a podcast's RSS feed and storing episode data. The vulnerability lies in the fact that it directly used the 'enclosure->url' from the RSS feed as the episode's path without any validation. An attacker could craft an RSS feed with an enclosure URL pointing to an internal service, and this function would save that malicious URL to the database.

App\Values\Podcast\EpisodePlayable::createForEpisode

app/Values/Podcast/EpisodePlayable.php

This function is called when a user plays a podcast episode. It retrieves the episode's path (which is the unvalidated URL stored by `synchronizeEpisodes`) and makes an HTTP GET request to it using `Http::sink($file)->get($episode->path)->throw()`. This action triggers the Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), as the server blindly makes a request to the URL that was previously stored, allowing an attacker to access internal network resources.

App\Ai\Tools\AddRadioStation::handle

app/Ai/Tools/AddRadioStation.php

This function, part of an AI assistant feature, allowed a user to add a radio station by providing a URL. It directly passed this URL to the `RadioService::createRadioStation` method without applying the necessary `SafeUrl` validation that was present in other parts of the application. This created a separate SSRF vulnerability, as an attacker could use this AI tool to make the server request an arbitrary internal URL.

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

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WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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