7.6

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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CVE-2026-45726

CVE-2026-45726: Omni: Reader-level users can retrieve imported cluster CA keys via ResourceService

Summary

Omni supports importing standalone Talos clusters.

During this process, an ImportedClusterSecrets resource is created, which contains the full CA secrets bundle for the cluster being imported.

If these secrets are not rotated by the importing actor, an authenticated Omni user with Reader access can read this resource and gain full access to the Talos, Kubernetes and etcd APIs of the cluster.

Severity

Attack Vector: Adjacent: the attacker needs to be in the same network to be able to access Talos/Kubernetes APIs with the compromised keys.
Attack Complexity: High: the attacker needs a deep understanding of Omni's internals. The resource is only created for imported clusters, and is normally not represented to users via any high-level API.
Privileges Required: Low: the role Reader is sufficient for the attacker to be able to read an imported cluster's secrets.
User Interaction: Required: another user must have imported a cluster to Omni for this vulnerability to exist.
Scope: Changed: the leaked CA private keys let an attacker directly get full control on Kubernetes or Talos, beyond the limitations enforced by Omni.
Confidentiality Impact: High: full cluster CA private keys (Kubernetes, Talos, etcd, service account) are exposed.
Integrity Impact: High: with the CA keys the attacker has full control on Kubernetes and Talos of the compromised (imported) cluster, and modify the workloads on it.
Availability Impact: High: with the CA keys the attacker has full control on Kubernetes and Talos of the compromised (imported) cluster, and modify the workloads on it.

Impact

Any Reader-level account can exfiltrate the complete CA private key hierarchy (Kubernetes CA, etcd CA, service account key) of the imported clusters whose secrets are not yet rotated ("tainted" imported clusters).
With the Kubernetes CA private key, an attacker can sign certificates for any Kubernetes user or group, including system:masters, achieving cluster-admin access to the imported cluster entirely outside Omni's control plane.
Impact scope extends beyond Omni to every Kubernetes workload, credential, and secret stored in the affected imported cluster.

Credit

This vulnerability was discovered and reported by bugbunny.ai.

(GitHub Advisory)

Miggo Vulnerability Database

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CVE-2026-45726

CVE-2026-45726:

7.6

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
github.com/siderolabs/omni	go	>= 1.3.0, < 1.6.6	1.6.6
github.com/siderolabs/omni	go	>= 1.7.0, < 1.7.3	1.7.3

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability allows a low-privileged user with 'Reader' role to access sensitive cluster secrets. The analysis of the provided patches identified two main changes to address this issue. The primary fix is in the filterAccess function located in internal/backend/runtime/omni/state_access.go. This function is responsible for authorizing access to various resources. Before the patch, the ImportedClusterSecrets resource, which contains the sensitive CA keys, was accessible to any user with read permissions. The patch introduces a specific check to ensure that only users with the 'Operator' role can access this resource. This directly remediates the reported vulnerability.

A secondary, defense-in-depth mitigation was also introduced: a new controller, ImportedClusterSecretsCleanupController, was added to automatically delete the ImportedClusterSecrets resource after its contents have been used. While this reduces the time window of exposure, the core vulnerability lies in the faulty access control logic within the filterAccess function. Therefore, filterAccess is the key vulnerable function that would be exercised during the exploitation of this vulnerability.

Vulnerable functions

github.com/siderolabs/omni/internal/backend/runtime/omni.filterAccess

internal/backend/runtime/omni/state_access.go

The `filterAccess` function is responsible for enforcing access control on resources. Before the patch, it allowed any user with `Reader` privileges to read `ImportedClusterSecrets` resources. These resources contain sensitive CA keys for imported clusters. An attacker with `Reader` access could exploit this to retrieve these keys and gain full control over the imported cluster. The function was vulnerable because it failed to enforce a sufficiently high privilege level for accessing these sensitive secrets.

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

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WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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