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Miggo AIRoot Cause AnalysisThe analysis of the security advisory and the associated patch commit 8ac96fa5a8840d2b141a5edd857e6228a1fc04e5 clearly indicates the vulnerability resides in the postgresMessageIterator.Next function located in pkg/ebpf/common/sql_detect_postgres.go. The vulnerability description explicitly points out that the Postgres protocol parser for BIND messages assumes a valid NUL-terminated portal name. The patch diff shows the removal of the unsafe slicing logic (msg.data[portalLen:]) and its replacement with a call to a new, safe parsing function parsePostgresBindNames. This new function properly validates the payload by checking for the NUL terminator's existence and ensuring the slice boundaries are respected before extracting the portal and statement names. The vulnerable code, which was removed, existed directly within the postgresMessageIterator.Next function, making it the function that would appear in a runtime profile when the vulnerability is triggered by a malicious BIND payload.
postgresMessageIterator.Nextpkg/ebpf/common/sql_detect_postgres.go
| Package Name | Ecosystem | Vulnerable Versions | First Patched Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| go.opentelemetry.io/obi | go | < 0.9.0 | 0.9.0 |