8.1

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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CVE-2026-45361

CVE-2026-45361: Apache Airflow Google provider: SSH host key verification disabled in ComputeEngineSSHHook (paramiko AutoAddPolicy default)

Apache Airflow providers-google's ComputeEngineSSHHook disables SSH host-key verification by default, exposing SSH traffic between an Airflow worker and a Compute Engine VM to in-path network attackers who can intercept or modify the session. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow-providers-google 22.0.0 or later.

(GitHub Advisory)

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CVE-2026-45361

CVE-2026-45361:

8.1

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

SSVC / BOD 26-04 ↗

Exploitation NoneAutomatable NoTech Impact Total

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Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
apache-airflow-providers-google	pip	>= 0, < 22.0.0	22.0.0

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability lies in the ComputeEngineSSHHook class, which by default disables SSH host key verification, making SSH connections to Compute Engine instances vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks. The analysis of the provided patch commit 120dbed3462cedcb980aac022c587ba434249eb1 pinpoints the exact locations of the vulnerability.

ComputeEngineSSHHook._connect_to_instance: This is the function where the insecure action occurs. Before the patch, it hardcoded the use of paramiko.AutoAddPolicy(), which instructs the SSH client to automatically trust and add any new host key. This is the core of the vulnerability, as it bypasses the check that ensures the client is connecting to the intended server.
ComputeEngineSSHHook.__init__: The class constructor is also identified as a vulnerable function because the patch modifies it to introduce a host_key_policy parameter. Crucially, the default value for this new parameter is set to "auto_add", preserving the previous insecure behavior for backward compatibility. This means that any code that instantiates this hook without explicitly setting a stricter policy (like "reject") remains vulnerable.

During a potential exploit, a runtime profiler on an Airflow worker would show the instantiation of the ComputeEngineSSHHook via its __init__ method, followed by a call to _connect_to_instance to establish the SSH connection. It is within _connect_to_instance that the disabled host key verification would allow an attacker to intercept and manipulate the SSH session.

Vulnerable functions

ComputeEngineSSHHook.__init__

airflow/providers/google/cloud/hooks/compute_ssh.py

The constructor for `ComputeEngineSSHHook` introduces a `host_key_policy` parameter with a default value of `"auto_add"`. This maintains the historically insecure behavior of automatically adding unknown SSH host keys, making users vulnerable by default if they do not explicitly specify a more secure policy.

ComputeEngineSSHHook._connect_to_instance

airflow/providers/google/cloud/hooks/compute_ssh.py

This function is responsible for creating the SSH connection. The vulnerability lies in the original implementation where it unconditionally used `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()`, which disables SSH host key verification. This allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to intercept the connection. The patch replaces this with a configurable policy, but the default remains insecure.

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WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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