7.5

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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CVE-2026-45088

CVE-2026-45088: Dalfox: Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Read with Out-of-Band Exfiltration via `custom-payload-file` in Dalfox Server Mode

Dalfox is a powerful open-source XSS scanner and utility focused on automation. Prior to 2.13.0, when dalfox is run in REST API server mode, the custom-payload-file field in model.Options is JSON-tagged and deserialized directly from the attacker's request body, then propagated unchanged through dalfox.Initialize into the scan engine. The engine passes the value to voltFile.ReadLinesOrLiteral, which reads lines from any file path accessible to the dalfox process and embeds each line as an XSS payload in outbound HTTP requests directed at the attacker-controlled target URL. Because the server has no API key by default, an unauthenticated network attacker can exfiltrate the contents of arbitrary files on the dalfox host by reading them line-by-line through scan traffic. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.13.0.

(GitHub Advisory)

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CVE-2026-45088

CVE-2026-45088:

7.5

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2	go	<= 2.12.0	2.13.0

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability is an unauthenticated arbitrary file read in Dalfox's server mode. It exists because the server does not properly sanitize user-provided options from API requests before passing them to the scanning engine. An attacker can make a POST request to the /scan endpoint (handled by server.postScanHandler) or interact with the MCP server (handled within mcp.RunMCPServer), providing a JSON payload that specifies a local file path in the custom-payload-file field. The application code, specifically the scanning.Scan function, trusts this input and uses it to read a file from the server's filesystem via the voltFile.ReadLinesOrLiteral function. The contents of the file are then exfiltrated line-by-line as part of the scanning traffic to an attacker-controlled URL. The vulnerability is patched by introducing a sanitizeAPIScanOptions function that strips dangerous, filesystem-related options from the request at the API boundary, before they are passed to the core scanning logic.

Vulnerable functions

server.postScanHandler

pkg/server/server.go

This function handles the '/scan' API endpoint. It deserializes the JSON request body, which is controlled by the attacker, into an `Options` struct. Before the patch, it passed these options, including the `CustomPayloadFile` field, to the scanning engine without validation. This allowed an unauthenticated attacker to specify an arbitrary file path for reading.

scanning.Scan

pkg/scanning/scan.go

This function is the core of the scanning engine. It receives the `Options` struct, and if the `CustomPayloadFile` field is set, it proceeds to read the specified file line by line. Each line is then used as a payload in the scan, and exfiltrated via out-of-band HTTP requests to an attacker-controlled server. This function contains the logic that directly triggers the arbitrary file read.

mcp.RunMCPServer

pkg/server/mcp.go

This function sets up the MCP (multi-component protocol) server. Within its tool handler, it constructs scan options based on the incoming request. Prior to the patch, these options were not sanitized, allowing an attacker to use fields like `CustomPayloadFile` to trigger the file read vulnerability, similar to the REST API endpoint.

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

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WAF Protection Rules

WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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