The vulnerability is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in the utcp-http library, affecting multiple communication protocols (http, streamable_http, sse). The root cause is a trust boundary violation. The register_manual function performs an initial, albeit flawed, security check on a URL used to discover tools from an OpenAPI specification. However, the call_tool and call_tool_streaming functions would later use the servers[0].url value from the fetched OpenAPI specification without any further validation. An attacker could host a malicious OpenAPI spec on a seemingly safe HTTPS URL. This spec could then specify an internal or cloud-metadata URL (e.g., http://169.254.169.254) in its servers field. When the agent invokes a tool from this spec, the call_tool or call_tool_streaming function would make a request to this internal URL, leading to a blind SSRF. This could be used to exfiltrate cloud credentials, scan internal networks, or access sensitive internal services. The patch addresses this by introducing and applying a strict ensure_secure_url check at two critical points: during the initial manual registration (fixing a startswith bypass) and, most importantly, immediately before the HTTP request is made in the call_tool and call_tool_streaming functions, thus closing the SSRF loophole.