7

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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CVE-2026-44495

CVE-2026-44495: Axios: Credential Theft and Response Hijacking via Prototype Pollution Gadget in Config Merge

Axios is a promise based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js. From 0.19.0 to before 0.31.1 and 1.15.2, Axios contains prototype-pollution gadgets in request config processing. If another vulnerability in the same JavaScript process has already polluted Object.prototype.transformResponse, affected Axios versions may treat that inherited value as request configuration or as an option validator. Axios does not itself create the prototype pollution. Exploitability requires a separate prototype-pollution vulnerability or equivalent attacker control over Object.prototype before Axios creates a request. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.31.1 and 1.15.2.

(GitHub Advisory)

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CVE-2026-44495

CVE-2026-44495:

7

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

SSVC / BOD 26-04 ↗

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Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
axios	npm	>= 1.0.0, < 1.15.2	1.15.2
axios	npm	>= 0.19.0, < 0.31.1	0.31.1

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability is a prototype pollution gadget in Axios. The root cause is in the mergeConfig function, which constructs a configuration object for each request. In vulnerable versions, this object inherited properties from Object.prototype. If an attacker could pollute Object.prototype with a property like transformResponse (via another vulnerability in the application's dependency tree), Axios would treat the inherited property as part of its own configuration.

The primary exploit vector involves polluting Object.prototype.transformResponse with a malicious function. When Axios processes a response, the transformData function executes this malicious function. Because transformData calls the function with the request configuration as its this context, the attacker's code gains access to all request details, including sensitive data like auth credentials and headers. The function can also modify the response data returned to the application.

The patch addresses this by changing mergeConfig to create a null-prototype object (Object.create(null)), which does not inherit from Object.prototype, effectively severing the pollution chain. Additionally, other direct property accesses in functions like assertOptions, resolveConfig, and the httpAdapter were hardened to use hasOwnProperty checks, preventing similar gadgets.

Vulnerable functions

mergeConfig

lib/core/mergeConfig.js

This function is the root cause of the vulnerability. It merges default and user-provided configurations into a new object. Before the patch, this new object inherited from `Object.prototype`. If an attacker could pollute `Object.prototype` (e.g., by adding a `transformResponse` property), this function would create a configuration object that also contained the malicious property, which was then used by other parts of the library.

transformData

lib/core/transformData.js

This function is responsible for applying response transformations. It reads the `transformResponse` property from the configuration object (created by `mergeConfig`) and executes it. In vulnerable versions, it would execute the malicious function inherited from the polluted `Object.prototype`, giving the attacker access to the entire request configuration (including credentials) via `this` context and allowing them to hijack the response.

assertOptions

lib/helpers/validator.js

This function validates configuration options against a schema. Before the patch, it accessed validator functions on the schema object without checking if the property was its own. This allowed an attacker to pollute `Object.prototype` with a malicious validator function, which `assertOptions` would then execute, leading to potential denial of service or information disclosure.

resolveConfig

lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js

This function resolves the final request configuration, including the URL. It was vulnerable because it read properties like `baseURL` and `auth` directly from the config object without checking for own properties. This could allow a polluted `Object.prototype.baseURL` to redirect the request to a malicious server.

httpAdapter

lib/adapters/http.js

The default Node.js HTTP adapter reads properties such as `auth`, `beforeRedirect`, and `insecureHTTPParser` from the configuration object to construct the request. In vulnerable versions, it accessed these properties without an own-property check, making it susceptible to prototype pollution. For example, a polluted `Object.prototype.auth` could have been used to inject unintended authentication credentials.

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WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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