9.4

CVSS Score

4.0

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

Concerned about an active attack path?

Talk to our security experts and see Miggo in action.

Miggo Vulnerability Database

→

CVE-2026-44477

CVE-2026-44477: CloudNativePG: Metrics exporter allows privilege escalation to PostgreSQL superuser and OS RCE

CloudNativePG is a platform designed to manage PostgreSQL databases within Kubernetes environments. Prior to 1.29.1 and 1.28.3, the CloudNativePG metrics exporter opens its PostgreSQL connection as the postgres superuser via the pod-local Unix socket, then demotes the session with SET ROLE pg_monitor. SET ROLE changes only current_user; session_user remains postgres. Any SQL expression evaluated inside the scrape session can invoke RESET ROLE to recover real superuser privileges, then use COPY ... TO PROGRAM to spawn an OS-level subprocess as the postgres user inside the primary pod. The READ ONLY transaction flag does not block this; it gates writes to database state, not external processes. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.29.1 and 1.28.3.

(GitHub Advisory)

Miggo Vulnerability Database

→

CVE-2026-44477

CVE-2026-44477:

9.4

CVSS Score

4.0

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

Is this CVE running in your environment?

Easily map the attack path and prioritize which CVEs are a threat to your organization

Validate Exposure

Technical Details

SSVC / BOD 26-04 ↗

Exploitation NoneAutomatable NoTech Impact Total

Select your environment

→SSVCScheduled60 days

Runtime reachability resolves your actual outcome.Book a demo

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
github.com/cloudnative-pg/cloudnative-pg	go	< 1.28.3	1.28.3
github.com/cloudnative-pg/cloudnative-pg	go	>= 1.29.0, < 1.29.1	1.29.1

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability exists because the CloudNativePG metrics exporter connects to the PostgreSQL database as the postgres superuser. It then executes SQL queries defined in a ConfigMap to collect metrics. The core of the vulnerability lies in the execution of these queries with elevated privileges.

The provided patches show that the default monitoring queries contained unqualified function and table names (e.g., current_database(), pg_stat_user_tables). This allows a low-privileged user to perform a search path attack. By creating a function or view with the same name in a schema they control, they can trick the metrics exporter into executing arbitrary code with superuser privileges.

The function current_database in config/manager/default-monitoring.yaml is a prime example of this vulnerability. It is part of the default configuration, making any cluster with default monitoring enabled susceptible to this attack. An attacker can shadow this function to gain superuser access and execute commands on the underlying operating system of the pod.

While the patches schema-qualify the names (e.g., pg_catalog.current_database()) to mitigate this specific attack vector, the underlying root cause is the high privilege level of the metrics exporter's database connection. The advisory notes a second patch, not detailed in the provided commits, that addresses this by using a dedicated, non-superuser role for the exporter. The functions identified are the triggers for the exploit, and their presence in a runtime profile during a metrics scrape would be an indicator of compromise if the malicious shadowing object exists.

Vulnerable functions

current_database

config/manager/default-monitoring.yaml

The CloudNativePG metrics exporter executes queries from the `default-monitoring.yaml` ConfigMap with superuser privileges. The `pg_extensions` query uses an unqualified call to `current_database()`. A low-privileged database user can create a malicious function named `current_database` in their own schema. Due to the search path resolution, this malicious function will be executed by the exporter with `postgres` superuser privileges, leading to privilege escalation and potential remote code execution in the pod.

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Unlock WAF rules for this CVE

Generate vendor-ready rules for the observed attack patterns, plus reasoning and safe deployment guidance

Get WAF rules

WAF Protection Rules

WAF Rule

W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.

Reasoning

*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.