The vulnerability exists within the process manager of pygeoapi. When a user submits a job to an OGC API-compliant process, they can include a subscriber object with URLs for receiving notifications about the job's status (in-progress, success, failure). The functions _send_in_progress_notification, _send_success_notification, and _send_failed_notification in the BaseManager class were responsible for sending these notifications. Before the patch, these functions would directly use the requests.post method to send a request to the user-supplied URLs without any validation. This created a classic Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. An unauthenticated attacker could craft a process execution request with a subscriber object containing URLs pointing to internal network resources (e.g., http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin). The pygeoapi server would then execute these requests, allowing the attacker to scan the internal network, access sensitive endpoints, or interact with internal services. The patch mitigates this by introducing a validation function, is_request_allowed, which checks if a URL resolves to a private or loopback IP address. By default, requests to such internal addresses are blocked, unless explicitly enabled via a new configuration setting allow_internal_requests.