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CVE-2026-42206

CVE-2026-42206: OpenID Connect nonce generated but never validated — ID token replay attack

Summary

The roadiz/openid package generates an OIDC nonce in OAuth2LinkGenerator::generate() and includes it in the authorization request sent to the identity provider, but never stores it and never validates it on the callback. The OpenIdJwtConfigurationFactory validation chain does not include a nonce constraint, and OpenIdAuthenticator::authenticate() never checks the nonce claim in the returned ID token against a stored value.

Details

In src/OAuth2LinkGenerator.php, a nonce is created and sent to the IdP:

'nonce' => $this->tokenGenerator->generateToken(),

However, this value is neither stored in session, cache, nor any other persistent store.

In src/OpenIdJwtConfigurationFactory.php, the JWT validation constraints are:

LooseValidAt (expiry)
PermittedFor (audience)
IssuedBy (issuer)
HostedDomain (optional)
UserInfoEndpoint (optional)

No nonce constraint is present.

In src/Authentication/OpenIdAuthenticator.php, the authenticate() method validates the state CSRF token correctly (fixed in v2.7.10), but never retrieves a stored nonce or compares it against the nonce claim in the ID token.

PoC

Obtain a valid ID token from a legitimate OIDC flow for a target user (e.g. via network interception, browser history leak, or referrer header exposure on a non-HTTPS redirect).
Replay the ID token: Since the nonce in the token is never cross-checked against a client-stored value, the token passes all validation constraints as long as it has not expired.
Result: An attacker can authenticate as the victim within the ID token's validity window.

Additionally, in an authorization code flow with multiple concurrent sessions, a malicious IdP or a compromised token endpoint could inject a token with a mismatched nonce, and the application would accept it silently.

Impact

ID token replay attacks: Valid but intercepted tokens can be reused for authentication within their validity period.
Token injection attacks: A malicious or compromised identity provider can inject tokens across sessions without detection.
Affects any Roadiz application using the roadiz/openid package with OpenID Connect SSO.

The OIDC Core 1.0 specification (Section 3.1.3.7) explicitly requires clients to verify the nonce claim if it was present in the authorization request.

(GitHub Advisory)

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CVE-2026-42206

CVE-2026-42206:

N/A

CVSS Score

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
roadiz/openid	composer	>= 2.7.0, < 2.7.18	2.7.18
roadiz/openid	composer	>= 2.6.0, < 2.6.31	2.6.31
roadiz/openid	composer	>= 2.5.0, < 2.5.45	2.5.45
roadiz/openid	composer	< 2.3.43	2.3.43

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The root cause of the vulnerability was a failure to implement the OpenID Connect nonce validation, a critical step for preventing ID token replay attacks. The roadiz/openid package had two key failings. First, in RZ\Roadiz\OpenId\OAuth2LinkGenerator::generate, a nonce was created for the authorization request but was not stored in the user's session, making it impossible to verify later. Second, in RZ\Roadiz\OpenId\Authentication\OpenIdAuthenticator::authenticate, there was no code to check the nonce claim in the ID token returned by the identity provider against a stored value. This allowed an attacker to capture a valid ID token and reuse it to authenticate as the victim at any point before the token expired. The patch addresses this by modifying generate() to store the nonce in the session and adding a new validation step in authenticate() to ensure the nonce in the token matches the one stored in the session for the current login attempt.

Vulnerable functions

RZ\Roadiz\OpenId\OAuth2LinkGenerator::generate

src/OAuth2LinkGenerator.php

This function generates the OIDC authorization URL. The vulnerability lies in the fact that while it generated a `nonce`, it did not store it anywhere for later verification. The patch modifies this function to generate a nonce, store it in the user's session, and then use that same nonce in the authorization URL. The original code generated a nonce but immediately discarded it, making validation impossible.

RZ\Roadiz\OpenId\Authentication\OpenIdAuthenticator::authenticate

src/Authentication/OpenIdAuthenticator.php

This function handles the authentication callback from the OpenID provider. The vulnerability existed because this function completely lacked any logic to validate the `nonce` claim in the received ID token. An attacker could replay a captured ID token because the application never checked if the token was issued for the specific, current authentication flow. The patch adds a new block of code to retrieve the expected nonce from the session, compare it with the nonce from the ID token, and fail the authentication if they do not match.

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Reasoning

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