The vulnerability exists in the is_local_url function within the tauri::webview::Webview implementation, specifically under compilation targets for Windows and Android. The advisory and the commit patch clearly indicate that the logic for determining a local origin was flawed. The original code would extract the first part of a domain name (e.g., 'app' from 'app.evil.com') and check if it matched a registered custom protocol. This created an origin confusion vulnerability, allowing a remote page to be treated as a trusted local page. The identified vulnerable function, tauri::webview::Webview::is_local_url, is the exact location of this flawed logic. The patch replaces the incorrect domain parsing with a strict check that the domain must be of the format <protocol>.localhost, effectively mitigating the vulnerability. Therefore, any runtime profile during exploitation on an affected system would show this function in the stack trace when the malicious URL is being processed.