10

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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CVE-2026-34976

CVE-2026-34976: Dgraph Affected by Pre-Auth Database Overwrite + SSRF + File Read via restoreTenant Missing Authorization

Dgraph is an open source distributed GraphQL database. Prior to 25.3.1, the restoreTenant admin mutation is missing from the authorization middleware config (admin.go), making it completely unauthenticated. Unlike the similar restore mutation which requires Guardian-of-Galaxy authentication, restoreTenant executes with zero middleware. This mutation accepts attacker-controlled backup source URLs (including file:// for local filesystem access), S3/MinIO credentials, encryption key file paths, and Vault credential file paths. An unauthenticated attacker can overwrite the entire database, read server-side files, and perform SSRF. This vulnerability is fixed in 25.3.1.

(GitHub Advisory)

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CVE-2026-34976

CVE-2026-34976:

10

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25	go	<= 25.3.0	25.3.1
github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v24	go	<= 24.0.5
github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph	go	<= 1.2.8

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The root cause of the vulnerability is a missing authorization check on the restoreTenant GraphQL mutation. The adminMutationMWConfig map in graphql/admin/admin.go defines the middleware (including authentication and IP whitelisting) for each administrative mutation. The restoreTenant mutation was absent from this map, causing the middleware chain to be empty and allowing unauthenticated execution.

An attacker can send a crafted restoreTenant mutation to a vulnerable Dgraph instance. This call is processed without any authentication, directly invoking the admin.RestoreTenant resolver. This resolver, in turn, calls other functions like worker.ProcessRestoreRequest, which handle the backup and restore logic.

By controlling the parameters of the restoreTenant mutation, an attacker can:

Overwrite the database: By providing an S3 URL to a malicious backup.
Read local files: By using a file:// URL in the location parameter, which triggers fileHandler.Read and fileHandler.ListPaths to access the filesystem. Further file reads are possible via the encryptionKeyFile and vaultRoleIDFile parameters, which are processed by functions like worker.BuildEncFlag.
Perform SSRF: By providing an internal IP address as the S3 endpoint or in the vaultAddr parameter.

The identified vulnerable functions are the key components in this exploit chain, starting from the unauthenticated entry point (admin.RestoreTenant) to the functions that perform the malicious actions (worker.ProcessRestoreRequest, fileHandler.Read, etc.).

Vulnerable functions

admin.RestoreTenant

graphql/admin/restore.go

This is the GraphQL resolver for the `restoreTenant` mutation. It was vulnerable because it was missing from the `adminMutationMWConfig` map in `graphql/admin/admin.go`, which meant it had no authentication or authorization middleware. This allowed any unauthenticated user to call it and access powerful features like restoring backups from arbitrary locations.

worker.ProcessRestoreRequest

worker/online_restore.go

This function is called by the unauthenticated `RestoreTenant` resolver. It takes attacker-controlled parameters, including the backup location (S3, file URI), credentials, and other sensitive information. This allows for database overwrites, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) by pointing to internal endpoints, and local file system access.

fileHandler.ListPaths

worker/backup_handler.go

When the `restoreTenant` mutation is called with a `file://` URI, this function is used to list the contents of directories on the server's local filesystem. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to probe the filesystem structure and identify interesting files.

fileHandler.Read

worker/backup_handler.go

When the `restoreTenant` mutation is called with a `file://` URI pointing to a file, this function is used to read the contents of that file. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to read arbitrary files on the server, limited only by file system permissions.

worker.BuildEncFlag

worker/online_restore.go

This function is called as part of the restore process and reads a file from the path provided in the `encryptionKeyFile` parameter of the `restoreTenant` mutation. An unauthenticated attacker can abuse this to read arbitrary files from the server's filesystem.

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WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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