9.1

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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CVE-2026-34448

CVE-2026-34448: SiYuan: Stored XSS in Attribute View Gallery/Kanban Cover Rendering Allows Arbitrary Command Execution in Desktop Client

Summary

An attacker who can place a malicious URL in an Attribute View mAsse field can trigger stored XSS when a victim opens the Gallery or Kanban view with “Cover From -> Asset Field” enabled. The vulnerable code accepts arbitrary http(s) URLs without extensions as images, stores the attacker-controlled string in coverURL, and injects it directly into an <img src="..."> attribute without escaping. In the Electron desktop client, the injected JavaScript executes with nodeIntegration enabled and contextIsolation disabled, so the XSS reaches arbitrary OS command execution under the victim’s account.

Details

The vulnerable flow is:

IsPossiblyImage(assetPath) accepts arbitrary http(s) URLs without validating that they are safe image URLs.
When an Attribute View card uses Cover From -> Asset Field, the application copies asset.Content directly into galleryCard.CoverURL / kanbanCard.CoverURL.
The front-end renderer inserts coverURL directly into <img src="${getCompressURL(item.coverURL)}"> without escaping quotes or other attribute-breaking characters.
A payload such as https://example.com/" onerror="require('child_process').exec('calc') breaks out of the src attribute and adds an attacker-controlled onerror handler. When the image fails to load, the injected JavaScript runs in the Electron renderer. Because the desktop app enables nodeIntegration: true and disables contextIsolation and webSecurity, that JavaScript can access Node.js APIs and execute system commands.

PoC

Install Electron Desktop app.
Create a database / Attribute View with an mAsset column and add at least one row.
Add any legitimate image to that mAsset field so the entry is stored as type image.
Switch the view to Gallery or Kanban. 5.Set Cover From to Asset Field and choose the mAsset column.
Edit the existing image asset entry and replace its link with the following payload:

https://example.com/" onerror="require('child_process').exec('calc')

Save the change and reopen or refresh the Gallery / Kanban view.
Observe that the rendered HTML contains an injected onerror handler and the Calculator application starts on Windows.

Example rendered output:

<img loading="lazy" class="av__gallery-img" src="https://example.com/" onerror="require('child_process').exec('calc')">

Impact

An attacker can store malicious content in a database asset field and execute arbitrary JavaScript when another user opens the affected Gallery or Kanban view. In the desktop client, that JavaScript has access to Node.js APIs, so the impact is not limited to browser-context XSS. The payload executes OS commands with the victim’s local user privileges, which turns this into remote code execution on the desktop application once the malicious content is delivered and rendered.

(GitHub Advisory)

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CVE-2026-34448

CVE-2026-34448:

9.1

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel	go	<= 3.6.1	3.6.2

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The analysis began by identifying the relevant patch from the commit history between the last vulnerable version (v3.6.1) and the first patched version (v3.6.2). The commit a1d2d0f1b02f87a804c84b2d964478dc6c2fb67f was identified as the security fix, as its commit message directly references the GHSA ID of the vulnerability.

An examination of this commit revealed that a new sanitization function, util.SanitizeImgSrc, was introduced in kernel/util/misc.go. This function uses the bluemonday library to clean image source URLs.

The patch then applies this new sanitization function in two key locations: kernel/sql/av_gallery.go and kernel/sql/av_kanban.go. Specifically, the lines asset.Content = util.SanitizeImgSrc(asset.Content) were added within the fillAttributeViewGalleryCardCover and fillAttributeViewKanbanCardCover functions, respectively.

This indicates that these two functions were the points of vulnerability. They were responsible for taking potentially malicious user input (asset.Content) and preparing it for rendering as a cover image URL. Before the patch, this was done without sanitization, leading to a stored XSS vulnerability. The vulnerability description confirms this flow, stating that asset.Content is copied directly to galleryCard.CoverURL or kanbanCard.CoverURL and then injected into an <img> tag without escaping. Therefore, fillAttributeViewGalleryCardCover and fillAttributeViewKanbanCardCover are the identified vulnerable functions.

Vulnerable functions

github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel/sql.fillAttributeViewGalleryCardCover

kernel/sql/av_gallery.go

This function was vulnerable because it processed user-provided asset content (`asset.Content`) and assigned it as a cover URL for gallery cards (`galleryCard.CoverURL`) without proper sanitization. A malicious URL in the asset content could break out of the `src` attribute of an `<img>` tag, leading to stored XSS when the gallery view is rendered. In the context of the Electron desktop app, this allowed for arbitrary command execution.

github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel/sql.fillAttributeViewKanbanCardCover

kernel/sql/av_kanban.go

This function was vulnerable because it processed user-provided asset content (`asset.Content`) and assigned it as a cover URL for kanban cards (`kanbanCard.CoverURL`) without proper sanitization. A malicious URL in the asset content could break out of the `src` attribute of an `<img>` tag, leading to stored XSS when the kanban view is rendered. In the context of the Electron desktop app, this allowed for arbitrary command execution.

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

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WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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