9.6

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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CVE-2026-33211

CVE-2026-33211: Tekton Pipelines git resolver has path traversal that allows reading arbitrary files from the resolver pod

Tekton Pipelines project provides k8s-style resources for declaring CI/CD-style pipelines. Starting in version 1.0.0 and prior to versions 1.0.1, 1.3.3, 1.6.1, 1.9.2, and 1.10.2, the Tekton Pipelines git resolver is vulnerable to path traversal via the pathInRepo parameter. A tenant with permission to create ResolutionRequests (e.g. by creating TaskRuns or PipelineRuns that use the git resolver) can read arbitrary files from the resolver pod's filesystem, including ServiceAccount tokens. The file contents are returned base64-encoded in resolutionrequest.status.data. Versions 1.0.1, 1.3.3, 1.6.1, 1.9.2, and 1.10.2 contain a patch.

(GitHub Advisory)

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CVE-2026-33211

CVE-2026-33211:

9.6

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
github.com/tektoncd/pipeline	go	>= 1.0.0, < 1.0.1	1.0.1
github.com/tektoncd/pipeline	go	>= 1.1.0, < 1.3.3	1.3.3
github.com/tektoncd/pipeline	go	>= 1.4.0, < 1.6.1	1.6.1
github.com/tektoncd/pipeline	go	>= 1.7.0, < 1.9.2	1.9.2
github.com/tektoncd/pipeline	go	>= 1.10.0, < 1.10.2	1.10.2

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability described is a path traversal in the Tekton Pipelines git resolver. The advisory explicitly mentions that the vulnerability was introduced in commit 318006c4e3a5 and that the vulnerable function is getFileContent in pkg/resolution/resolver/git/repository.go.

Analysis of the introducing commit (318006c4e3a5) confirms the creation of the getFileContent function. This function takes a path string and uses it in os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(repo.directory, path)) without any sanitization, which is the root cause of the path traversal vulnerability.

Analysis of the fixing commit (961388fcf337) shows two key changes. First, the getFileContent function was significantly modified to resolve symlinks and perform containment checks to ensure the resolved path is within the repository's directory. Second, the PopulateDefaultParams function in pkg/resolution/resolver/git/resolver.go was updated to validate the pathInRepo parameter at an earlier stage, rejecting any input containing .. sequences.

Based on this evidence, (*repository).getFileContent is identified as the primary vulnerable function, as it is directly responsible for the unsafe file access. PopulateDefaultParams is also included as a related function that was modified to implement a security control (input validation) as part of the fix.

Vulnerable functions

github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/pkg/resolution/resolver/git.(*repository).getFileContent

pkg/resolution/resolver/git/repository.go

The function `getFileContent` is vulnerable to path traversal. It directly uses the user-provided `path` parameter and joins it with the repository's directory path using `filepath.Join`. It then reads the content of the resulting path using `os.ReadFile`. There is no validation or sanitization of the `path` parameter to prevent directory traversal sequences like `../../`. This allows an attacker to craft a path that escapes the intended repository directory and read arbitrary files from the resolver pod's filesystem.

github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/pkg/resolution/resolver/git.PopulateDefaultParams

pkg/resolution/resolver/git/resolver.go

This function was modified as part of the fix to add input validation on the `pathInRepo` parameter. Before the fix, this function did not validate the path for traversal sequences. While the core vulnerability is in `getFileContent`, this function is where the user-controlled input is processed and should have been validated. The patch adds a check to reject paths containing '..' components.

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WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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