8.1

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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CVE-2026-32302

CVE-2026-32302: OpenClaw: Untrusted web origins can obtain authenticated operator.admin access in trusted-proxy mode

OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to 2026.3.11, browser-originated WebSocket connections could bypass origin validation when gateway.auth.mode was set to trusted-proxy and the request arrived with proxy headers. A page served from an untrusted origin could connect through a trusted reverse proxy, inherit proxy-authenticated identity, and establish a privileged operator session. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.3.11.

(GitHub Advisory)

Miggo Vulnerability Database

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CVE-2026-32302

CVE-2026-32302:

8.1

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
openclaw	npm	< 2026.3.11	2026.3.11

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability is a bypass of the WebSocket origin check in OpenClaw's gateway when operating in trusted-proxy authentication mode. The root cause is located in the resolveHandshakeBrowserSecurityContext function in src/gateway/server/ws-connection/message-handler.ts. The provided patch explicitly modifies the logic within this function. Previously, the condition to enforce an origin check was hasBrowserOriginHeader && !params.hasProxyHeaders. This meant that if a request was identified as coming from a browser (had an Origin header) but also contained proxy headers (like X-Forwarded-For), the origin check was skipped. An attacker could exploit this by crafting a malicious webpage that initiates a WebSocket connection to the vulnerable OpenClaw gateway through a trusted reverse proxy. The proxy adds the necessary headers, causing the gateway to trust the connection and bypass the crucial origin validation. This allows the malicious site to inherit the proxy's authenticated session, potentially gaining operator.admin privileges, leading to sensitive information disclosure and unauthorized actions. The fix removes the proxy header exemption (!params.hasProxyHeaders), ensuring that all browser-originated WebSocket connections are subject to origin validation, regardless of whether they pass through a proxy.

Vulnerable functions

resolveHandshakeBrowserSecurityContext

src/gateway/server/ws-connection/message-handler.ts

This function contained flawed logic that disabled WebSocket origin validation when proxy headers were present in a browser-originated request. The original code (`hasBrowserOriginHeader && !params.hasProxyHeaders`) created a security bypass, allowing an untrusted web origin to establish a privileged WebSocket connection by routing its request through a trusted proxy. The fix removes the `!params.hasProxyHeaders` condition, ensuring origin checks are always enforced for browser requests.

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

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WAF Protection Rules

WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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