The vulnerability is an open redirect caused by improper validation of the redirect_uri parameter in the experimental OIDC provider of @backstage/plugin-auth-backend. The core issue was in the OidcService class, where the registerClient and getRedirectUri methods used a simple string-based pattern match to validate redirect URIs. This method was insufficient because it did not correctly handle URIs containing a userinfo component (e.g., http://username@hostname). An attacker could craft a URI such as http://expected-host.com@attacker.com/callback. The validation logic would see http://expected-host.com and approve the redirect, but the browser would actually send the user and their authorization code to attacker.com. The patch addresses this by introducing a validateRedirectUri function that parses the URI, strips any userinfo by reconstructing the URL from its protocol, host, and pathname, and then performs the pattern match on the normalized URI. This ensures that the validation is performed on the actual host the user will be redirected to.