8.7

CVSS Score

4.0

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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CVE-2026-31975

CVE-2026-31975: Cloud CLI WebSocket shell injection

Cloud CLI (aka Claude Code UI) is a desktop and mobile UI for Claude Code, Cursor CLI, Codex, and Gemini-CLI. Prior to 1.25.0, OS Command Injection via WebSocket Shell. Both projectPath and initialCommand in server/index.js are taken directly from the WebSocket message payload and interpolated into a bash command string without any sanitization, enabling arbitrary OS command execution. A secondary injection vector exists via unsanitized sessionId. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.25.0.

(GitHub Advisory)

Miggo Vulnerability Database

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CVE-2026-31975

CVE-2026-31975:

8.7

CVSS Score

4.0

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
@siteboon/claude-code-ui	npm	<= 1.24.0	1.25.0

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability is a chain of three weaknesses that result in unauthenticated remote code execution. The analysis of the security advisory and the provided patch (commit 12e7f074d9563b3264caf9cec6e1b701c301af26) confirms this. The root cause starts with a hardcoded default JWT secret, allowing attackers to forge authentication tokens. The authenticateWebSocket function in server/middleware/auth.js is the second link; it improperly validates these tokens by not checking for the user's existence in the database, thus permitting an authentication bypass. The final and most critical vulnerability lies in the handleShellConnection function in server/index.js. This function receives data over the authenticated WebSocket and constructs shell commands by unsafely concatenating user input (projectPath, initialCommand), leading directly to OS command injection. The patch remediates these issues by removing the hardcoded secret, adding database validation to authenticateWebSocket, and rewriting handleShellConnection to properly handle user input by using cwd and validating parameters, thus preventing the injection.

Vulnerable functions

authenticateWebSocket

server/middleware/auth.js

This function was vulnerable to an authentication bypass. It only verified the JWT signature without checking if the `userId` in the token payload existed in the database. This allowed an attacker, using a JWT signed with the insecure default secret, to impersonate a non-existent user and gain access to authenticated WebSocket functionalities.

handleShellConnection

server/index.js

This function was vulnerable to OS command injection. It directly interpolated un-sanitized user-controlled data from a WebSocket message (`projectPath`, `initialCommand`, and `sessionId`) into a shell command string. After bypassing authentication via the `authenticateWebSocket` vulnerability, an attacker could send a malicious payload to this function to execute arbitrary commands on the server.

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

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WAF Protection Rules

WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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