9.1

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

Concerned about an active attack path?

Talk to our security experts and see Miggo in action.

Miggo Vulnerability Database

→

CVE-2026-31862

CVE-2026-31862: Cloud CLI has Command Injection via Multiple Parameters

Cloud CLI (aka Claude Code UI) is a desktop and mobile UI for Claude Code, Cursor CLI, Codex, and Gemini-CLI. Prior to 1.24.0, multiple Git-related API endpoints use execAsync() with string interpolation of user-controlled parameters (file, branch, message, commit), allowing authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.24.0.

(GitHub Advisory)

Miggo Vulnerability Database

→

CVE-2026-31862

CVE-2026-31862:

9.1

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

Is this CVE running in your environment?

Easily map the attack path and prioritize which CVEs are a threat to your organization

Validate Exposure

Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
@siteboon/claudecodeui	npm	<= 1.23.0	1.24.0

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability is a classic command injection flaw affecting multiple API endpoints in server/routes/git.js. The root cause is the use of an execAsync function, which internally uses child_process.exec. This function executes commands in a shell, making it vulnerable if user-controlled input is not properly sanitized.

In this case, parameters such as file, branch, message, and commit are taken from user requests and directly interpolated into the command string. While there was an attempt to escape double quotes for the message parameter, it was insufficient and easily bypassed using other shell metacharacters like $(command).

The vulnerable functions are the anonymous route handlers for the affected API endpoints. During exploitation, a runtime profiler would show these handlers in the stack trace, which in turn call the vulnerable execAsync function.

The fix was to replace all vulnerable execAsync calls with a spawnAsync helper. This helper uses child_process.spawn with shell: false and passes arguments as an array. This ensures that user-supplied values are treated as literal arguments to the git command and are not interpreted by the shell, thus mitigating the command injection vulnerability.

Vulnerable functions

(anonymous function for GET /api/git/status)

server/routes/git.js

The 'file' parameter from the user request is directly interpolated into a shell command string passed to execAsync, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary OS commands.

(anonymous function for POST /api/git/commit)

server/routes/git.js

The 'files' and 'message' parameters from the user request are used to construct shell commands for execAsync. The quote escaping for the 'message' parameter is insufficient and can be bypassed, leading to command injection.

(anonymous function for GET /api/git/commit-diff)

server/routes/git.js

The 'commit' parameter from the user request is interpolated into a shell command string without any quoting or sanitization, allowing for direct command injection.

(anonymous function for GET /api/git/diff)

server/routes/git.js

The 'file' parameter is used in multiple `execAsync` calls within this endpoint's handler, creating vulnerabilities for command injection. The patch replaces these calls with `spawnAsync`.

(anonymous function for GET /api/git/file-with-diff)

server/routes/git.js

The 'file' parameter is used in multiple `execAsync` calls within this endpoint's handler, creating vulnerabilities for command injection. The patch replaces these calls with `spawnAsync`.

(anonymous function for POST /api/git/checkout)

server/routes/git.js

The 'branch' parameter is used in an `execAsync` call, allowing command injection. The patch replaces this with `spawnAsync`.

(anonymous function for POST /api/git/create-branch)

server/routes/git.js

The 'branch' parameter is used in an `execAsync` call, allowing command injection. The patch replaces this with `spawnAsync`.

(anonymous function for GET /api/git/commits)

server/routes/git.js

The 'commit.hash' parameter is used in an `execAsync` call, allowing command injection. The patch replaces this with `spawnAsync`.

(anonymous function for POST /api/git/generate-commit-message)

server/routes/git.js

The 'file' parameter is used in an `execAsync` call, allowing command injection. The patch replaces this with `spawnAsync`.

(anonymous function for POST /api/git/discard)

server/routes/git.js

The 'file' parameter is used in multiple `execAsync` calls within this endpoint's handler, creating vulnerabilities for command injection. The patch replaces these calls with `spawnAsync`.

(anonymous function for POST /api/git/delete-untracked)

server/routes/git.js

The 'file' parameter is used in an `execAsync` call, allowing command injection. The patch replaces this with `spawnAsync`.

(anonymous function for POST /api/git/publish)

server/routes/git.js

The 'branch' parameter is used in an `execAsync` call, allowing command injection. The patch replaces this with `spawnAsync`.

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Unlock WAF rules for this CVE

Generate vendor-ready rules for the observed attack patterns, plus reasoning and safe deployment guidance

Get WAF rules

WAF Protection Rules

WAF Rule

W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.W** rul*s *v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.

Reasoning

*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.*v*il**l* *or Mi**o *ustom*rs only.