6.5

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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CVE-2026-31246

CVE-2026-31246: GPT-Pilot contains a command injection vulnerability in the Executor.run() method

GPT-Pilot thru commit 0819827ce20346ef5f25b3fe29293cb448840565 (2025-09-03) contains a command injection vulnerability (CWE-78) in the Executor.run() method. During project execution, when the system prompts the user to confirm or modify a command to be run, it accepts free-text input without proper validation. The user-supplied input is directly passed to asyncio.create_subprocess_shell() for execution. This allows an attacker to replace the intended command with arbitrary shell commands, leading to remote code execution with the privileges of the GPT-Pilot process.

(GitHub Advisory)

Miggo Vulnerability Database

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CVE-2026-31246

CVE-2026-31246:

6.5

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
gpt-pilot	pip	<= 0.0.10

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability exists in the Executor.run method within core/agents/executor.py. The application prompts the user to confirm a command before execution. However, it allows the user to modify the command via free-text input. This input is captured in confirm.text and then assigned to the cmd variable if the user's action is not a simple 'yes' confirmation. This cmd variable, now containing potentially malicious user input, is passed to ProcessManager.run_command and subsequently to LocalProcess.start, which uses asyncio.create_subprocess_shell to execute the command. Since there is no validation or sanitization of the user-provided input, an attacker can inject arbitrary shell commands, leading to remote code execution with the privileges of the gpt-pilot process. The primary vulnerable function is Executor.run where the unsanitized input is accepted. The functions ProcessManager.run_command and LocalProcess.start are also included as they are part of the direct execution flow of the tainted command and would appear in a runtime profile during exploitation.

Vulnerable functions

Executor.run

core/agents/executor.py

The `run` method in the `Executor` class receives a command to be executed. It prompts the user for confirmation, but allows the user to provide a modified command. This user-supplied command from `confirm.text` is then assigned to the `cmd` variable and executed without any sanitization or validation, leading to a command injection vulnerability.

ProcessManager.run_command

core/proc/process_manager.py

This function receives the tainted command from `Executor.run` and passes it to `start_process`, which eventually executes it. This function is part of the vulnerable execution chain.

LocalProcess.start

core/proc/process_manager.py

This function is the final step in the execution chain, where the unsanitized command is passed to `asyncio.create_subprocess_shell`, which executes shell commands. This is the function that directly interacts with the underlying vulnerable OS command execution.

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

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WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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