8.7

CVSS Score

4.0

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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CVE-2026-30820

CVE-2026-30820: Flowise Authorization Bypass via Spoofed x-request-from Header

Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to version 3.0.13, Flowise trusts any HTTP client that sets the header x-request-from: internal, allowing an authenticated tenant session to bypass all /api/v1/** authorization checks. With only a browser cookie, a low-privilege tenant can invoke internal administration endpoints (API key management, credential stores, custom function execution, etc.), effectively escalating privilege. This issue has been patched in version 3.0.13.

(GitHub Advisory)

Miggo Vulnerability Database

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CVE-2026-30820

CVE-2026-30820:

8.7

CVSS Score

4.0

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
flowise	npm	<= 3.0.12	3.0.13

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability is an authorization bypass in Flowise, caused by improperly trusting the x-request-from: internal HTTP header. The main application middleware, located in packages/server/src/index.ts within the App.init method, checks for this header. If present, it proceeds to only verify the user's session (verifyToken) without performing any further authorization checks. This allows any authenticated user, regardless of their privileges, to access any API endpoint under /api/v1/ by simply adding the spoofed header to their request.

This analysis identified two key functions:

App.init (middleware): This is the root of the vulnerability. The code snippet from the advisory clearly shows the flawed logic. An attacker would trigger this function on every malicious request.
upsertVector: This function is an example of a privileged operation that becomes accessible through the bypass. The patch that adds a workspace ownership check (workspaceId !== req.user?.activeWorkspaceId) confirms that it was previously lacking proper authorization. An exploit targeting vector upsertion would cause this function to appear in a runtime profile.

By identifying both the entry point of the bypass and a function that becomes exploitable, we can effectively detect exploitation of this vulnerability.

Vulnerable functions

App.init

packages/server/src/index.ts

The main application middleware in `App.init` contains a flaw where it trusts the `x-request-from: internal` header. When this header is present, it only calls `verifyToken` which performs authentication but not authorization. This allows any authenticated user to bypass authorization checks for all `/api/v1/**` routes, leading to privilege escalation.

upsertVector

packages/server/src/utils/upsertVector.ts

This function was missing an authorization check to verify that the user has access to the workspace. An attacker could exploit the `x-request-from: internal` bypass to call this function and perform actions on any workspace. The patch adds the necessary authorization check.

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

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WAF Protection Rules

WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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