8.2

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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CVE-2026-29064

CVE-2026-29064: Zarf: Symlink targets in archives are not validated against destination directory

Zarf is an Airgap Native Packager Manager for Kubernetes. From version 0.54.0 to before version 0.73.1, a path traversal vulnerability in archive extraction allows a specifically crafted Zarf package to create symlinks pointing outside the destination directory, enabling arbitrary file read or write on the system processing the package. This issue has been patched in version 0.73.1.

(GitHub Advisory)

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CVE-2026-29064

CVE-2026-29064:

8.2

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
github.com/zarf-dev/zarf/src/pkg/archive	go	>= 0.54.0, < 0.73.1	0.73.1

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability is a classic path traversal issue, often referred to as 'Zip Slip', but in this case, it involves symlinks within a tar archive. The root cause lies in the archive extraction logic in src/pkg/archive/archive.go. Three internal handler functions, defaultHandler, stripHandler, and filterHandler, were responsible for processing archive entries. Each of these functions contained a call to os.Symlink to create symbolic links based on the LinkTarget field provided in the archive. The critical flaw was the failure to validate that the LinkTarget, especially when combined with the destination path, resolved to a location safely within the intended extraction directory. An attacker could craft an archive with a LinkTarget containing '..' sequences to traverse up the directory tree and create a symlink pointing to an arbitrary location on the filesystem. A subsequent entry in the same archive could then write to this symlink, allowing for arbitrary file write. The patch addresses this by replacing the direct, unsafe os.Symlink calls with a new writeEntry function. This new function utilizes the os.Root API, which provides kernel-level protection against path traversal, and adds explicit validation for symlink targets to ensure they are relative and do not escape the root extraction directory.

Vulnerable functions

archive.defaultHandler.func1

src/pkg/archive/archive.go

The anonymous function returned by `defaultHandler` is vulnerable to path traversal. It constructs a symlink path by joining the destination directory (`dst`) with the `LinkTarget` from the archive entry (`f.LinkTarget`) without validating if the resulting path escapes the destination directory. This allows an attacker to craft an archive that creates a symlink pointing to an arbitrary location on the filesystem.

archive.stripHandler.func1

src/pkg/archive/archive.go

The anonymous function returned by `stripHandler` is vulnerable to path traversal. It uses the `LinkTarget` from the archive entry (`f.LinkTarget`) verbatim when creating a symlink. No validation is performed to ensure the target is within the destination directory, allowing an attacker to create a symlink pointing to any location on the filesystem.

archive.filterHandler.func1

src/pkg/archive/archive.go

The anonymous function returned by `filterHandler` is vulnerable to path traversal. Similar to `defaultHandler`, it constructs a symlink path by joining the destination directory (`dst`) with the `LinkTarget` from the archive entry (`f.LinkTarget`). The lack of validation allows a malicious archive to create a symlink outside the intended extraction directory.

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

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WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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