Summary
OliveTin's shell mode safety check (checkShellArgumentSafety) blocks several dangerous argument types but not password. A user supplying a password-typed argument can inject shell metacharacters that execute arbitrary OS commands. A second independent vector allows unauthenticated RCE via webhook-extracted JSON values that skip type safety checks entirely before reaching sh -c.
Details
Vector 1 — password type bypasses shell safety check (PR:L)
service/internal/executor/arguments.go has two gaps:
// Line 198-199 — TypeSafetyCheck returns nil (no error) for password type
case "password":
return nil // accepts ANY string including ; | ` $()
// Line 313 — checkShellArgumentSafety blocks dangerous types but not password
unsafe := map[string]bool{
"url": true,
"email": true,
"raw_string_multiline": true,
"very_dangerous_raw_string": true,
// "password" is absent — not blocked
}
Shell execution at service/internal/executor/executor_unix.go:18:
exec.CommandContext(ctx, "sh", "-c", finalParsedCommand)
A user supplies a password argument value of '; id; echo ' → sh -c interprets the shell metacharacters → arbitrary command execution.
This is not the "admin already has access" pattern: OliveTin explicitly enforces an admin/user boundary where admins define commands and users only supply argument values. The password type is the documented, intended mechanism for user-supplied sensitive values. The safety check exists precisely to prevent users from escaping this boundary — password is the one type it fails to block.
Vector 2 — Webhook JSON extraction skips TypeSafetyCheck entirely (PR:N)
service/internal/executor/handler.go:153-157 extracts arbitrary key-value pairs from webhook JSON payloads and injects them into . These webhook-extracted arguments have no corresponding config-defined entry, so in finds no type to check against and skips entirely. The values are templated directly into the shell command and passed to .