N/A

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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CVE-2026-27167

CVE-2026-27167: Gradio: Mocked OAuth Login Exposes Server Credentials and Uses Hardcoded Session Secret

Gradio is an open-source Python package designed for quick prototyping. Starting in version 4.16.0 and prior to version 6.6.0, Gradio applications running outside of Hugging Face Spaces automatically enable "mocked" OAuth routes when OAuth components (e.g. gr.LoginButton) are used. When a user visits /login/huggingface, the server retrieves its own Hugging Face access token via huggingface_hub.get_token() and stores it in the visitor's session cookie. If the application is network-accessible, any remote attacker can trigger this flow to steal the server owner's HF token. The session cookie is signed with a hardcoded secret derived from the string "-v4", making the payload trivially decodable. Version 6.6.0 fixes the issue.

(GitHub Advisory)

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CVE-2026-27167

CVE-2026-27167:

N/A

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
gradio	pip	>= 4.16.0, < 6.6.0	6.6.0

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The analysis of the vulnerability is based on the detailed description provided and the code changes in the associated commit dfee0da06d0aa94b3c2684131e7898d5d5c1911e. The root cause of the primary vulnerability (credential leakage) is located in the _get_mocked_oauth_info function in gradio/oauth.py. The function was designed for a mocked OAuth flow but incorrectly used the server's actual Hugging Face token instead of a dummy one. The patch confirms this by replacing the real token with a hardcoded mock value, "mock-oauth-token-for-local-dev". This vulnerability is exacerbated by a weak, hardcoded session signing secret ("-v4"), which allows an attacker to easily decode the session cookie and extract the token. The provided patch also addresses a secondary open redirect vulnerability within the _redirect_to_target function in the same file. This function failed to sanitize a URL provided by the user, allowing for redirects to malicious sites. Both functions are part of the OAuth process and would appear in a runtime profile during exploitation.

Vulnerable functions

_get_mocked_oauth_info

gradio/oauth.py

This function was responsible for retrieving the real Hugging Face access token from the server's environment (`huggingface_hub.get_token()`) and including it in the information returned for the mocked OAuth flow. This sensitive token was then stored in the user's session cookie, making it accessible to a remote attacker.

_redirect_to_target

gradio/oauth.py

This function handled redirects within the OAuth flow. It was vulnerable to an open redirect attack because it used the user-provided `_target_url` query parameter to build a `RedirectResponse` without proper validation. An attacker could craft a URL that, when visited, would redirect the user to a malicious external website.

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

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WAF Protection Rules

WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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