4.1

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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CVE-2026-26019

CVE-2026-26019: @langchain/community affected by SSRF Bypass in RecursiveUrlLoader via insufficient URL origin validation

LangChain is a framework for building LLM-powered applications. Prior to 1.1.14, the RecursiveUrlLoader class in @langchain/community is a web crawler that recursively follows links from a starting URL. Its preventOutside option (enabled by default) is intended to restrict crawling to the same site as the base URL. The implementation used String.startsWith() to compare URLs, which does not perform semantic URL validation. An attacker who controls content on a crawled page could include links to domains that share a string prefix with the target, causing the crawler to follow links to attacker-controlled or internal infrastructure. Additionally, the crawler performed no validation against private or reserved IP addresses. A crawled page could include links targeting cloud metadata services, localhost, or RFC 1918 addresses, and the crawler would fetch them without restriction. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.1.14.

(GitHub Advisory)

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CVE-2026-26019

CVE-2026-26019:

4.1

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
@langchain/community	npm	<= 1.1.13	1.1.14

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
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Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in the RecursiveUrlLoader class of @langchain/community. The root cause is twofold. First, the getChildLinks function used an insecure String.prototype.startsWith() method to validate that crawled links were on the same domain as the starting URL. This allows an attacker to bypass the check with a domain that shares a prefix with the target domain (e.g., http://example.com.attacker.com passes a check for http://example.com). Second, the functions responsible for fetching URL content, getUrlAsDoc and _scrape, performed no validation to block requests to private, reserved, or metadata IP addresses. An attacker who can control the content of a crawled page (e.g., by posting a link) could exploit this to make the server issue requests to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints (potentially exposing credentials), or localhost. The patch resolves these issues by replacing the startsWith check with a proper origin comparison (isSameOrigin) and by introducing and applying a new SSRF protection utility (validateSafeUrl) before all outbound network requests in the loader.

Vulnerable functions

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WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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