8.7

CVSS Score

4.0

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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CVE-2026-24740

CVE-2026-24740: Dozzle Agent Label-Based Access Control Bypass Allows Unauthorized Container Shell Access

Dozzle is a realtime log viewer for docker containers. Prior to version 9.0.3, a flaw in Dozzle’s agent-backed shell endpoints allows a user restricted by label filters (for example, label=env=dev) to obtain an interactive root shell in out‑of‑scope containers (for example, env=prod) on the same agent host by directly targeting their container IDs. Version 9.0.3 contains a patch for the issue.

(GitHub Advisory)

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CVE-2026-24740

CVE-2026-24740:

8.7

CVSS Score

4.0

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
github.com/amir20/dozzle	go	< 1.29.1-0.20260125230338-620e59aa2463	1.29.1-0.20260125230338-620e59aa2463

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability is an authorization bypass in Dozzle's agent mode, where label-based access controls for containers were not enforced for shell access. The root cause lies in the FindContainer function within the agentService (internal/support/container/agent_service.go). This function, when looking up a container by its ID, failed to pass along the user's label filters to the agent client. Consequently, the agent would find any container matching the ID, regardless of the user's permissions.

The patch 620e59aa246347ba8a27e68c532853b8a5137bc1 rectifies this by modifying two key functions. First, agentService.FindContainer is updated to pass the labels to the agent client. Second, the agent client's Client.FindContainer function in internal/agent/client.go is updated to accept these labels and include them in the request sent to the remote agent. This ensures that the label filters are correctly applied, preventing unauthorized access. During an exploit, these two FindContainer functions would be on the execution path, making them key indicators in a runtime profile.

Vulnerable functions

agentService.FindContainer

internal/support/container/agent_service.go

This function is responsible for finding a container. The original implementation ignored the `labels` parameter, which contains the user's access control filters. It called the underlying `a.client.FindContainer` with only the container `id`, bypassing the label-based authorization check. This allowed a user with restricted access to find and interact with any container on the agent host by knowing its ID.

Client.FindContainer

internal/agent/client.go

This function, called by `agentService.FindContainer`, is the client implementation for finding a container on a remote agent. The original function signature did not accept any label filters. The patch modifies the function to accept `labels` and includes them in the gRPC request to the agent, ensuring that the agent applies the necessary filters when searching for the container. The original implementation facilitated the bypass by not having the capability to pass on the filters.

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

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WAF Protection Rules

WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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