5.3

CVSS Score

4.0

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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CVE-2026-2130

CVE-2026-2130: BurtTheCoder mcp-maigret search_username index.ts command injection

A vulnerability was determined in BurtTheCoder mcp-maigret up to 1.0.12. This affects an unknown part of the file src/index.ts of the component search_username. Executing a manipulation of the argument Username can lead to command injection. The attack may be launched remotely. Upgrading to version 1.0.13 is able to mitigate this issue. This patch is called b1ae073c4b3e789ab8de36dc6ca8111ae9399e7a. Upgrading the affected component is advised.

(GitHub Advisory)

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CVE-2026-2130

CVE-2026-2130:

5.3

CVSS Score

4.0

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
mcp-maigret	npm	< 1.0.13	1.0.13

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability is a classic command injection flaw within the mcp-maigret Node.js server. The root cause lies in the MaigretServer.handleToolRequest method, which dynamically constructed a docker run command as a single string. This string incorporated unsanitized user input from the username, url, and tags parameters. The composed command string was then passed to the MaigretServer.execCommand method, which utilized child_process.exec. The use of exec is dangerous because it spawns a shell to execute the command, meaning any shell metacharacters (like ;, |, &, $()) in the user input would be interpreted and executed by the shell.

The patch addresses this vulnerability in multiple ways:

Replacing exec with execFile: The execCommand function was fundamentally changed to use child_process.execFile. Unlike exec, execFile does not spawn a shell, and it accepts the command and its arguments as an array. This is the primary mitigation, as it prevents the operating system from interpreting metacharacters within the arguments.
Argument-based Command Execution: Instead of concatenating a single command string, the code now builds an array of arguments (dockerArgs) and passes it to the new execFile-based execCommand. This ensures a clean separation between the command and its parameters.
Input Validation: Strict validation functions (isValidUsername, isValidUrl, isValidTag) were introduced and are now used within handleToolRequest to reject any input containing characters that are not explicitly allowed. This provides an additional layer of defense.

During exploitation, a profiler would show MaigretServer.handleToolRequest being called, which in turn calls the vulnerable version of MaigretServer.execCommand. Both functions are critical to the execution of the injected command.

Vulnerable functions

MaigretServer.handleToolRequest

src/index.ts

The `handleToolRequest` function was vulnerable to command injection because it constructed a raw shell command string using user-provided arguments (`username`, `tags`, `url`) without proper sanitization. This command string was then executed, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary commands by crafting malicious input for the 'username', 'tags', or 'url' parameters.

MaigretServer.execCommand

src/index.ts

The original `execCommand` function used `child_process.exec` (via `promisify(exec)`), which executes commands within a shell. This allowed for shell metacharacters in the command string (constructed in `handleToolRequest`) to be interpreted, leading to command injection. The function was changed to use `execFile`, which executes a command without a shell, and accepts arguments as an array, mitigating the injection vulnerability.

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

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WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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