The vulnerability is a time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition in Turbo Frames. The root cause is that in-flight network requests for Turbo Frames were not being canceled when the state of the frame element changed in a way that should have invalidated the request. Specifically, when a frame was disconnected from the DOM, disabled, or had its src attribute removed, any pending responses could still be processed by the browser. If these responses contained a Set-Cookie header from a previous session state (e.g., before a logout), they could restore a stale session cookie on the client-side, effectively reverting the session-invalidating action. The patch addresses this by explicitly canceling the currentFetchRequest within the disconnected, disabledChanged, and sourceURLChanged methods of the FrameController class. These functions are the key runtime indicators, as they are the points where the application logic failed to prevent the processing of a response from an invalidated request.